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With the rising ubiquity of online platforms, there is an increasing focus on platforms’ role in 
enabling fair exchanges between buyers and sellers. Traditionally, platforms have inbuilt 
mechanisms such as screening or upfront data-gathering disclosure that encourage transactions 
between unfamiliar participants. Since such mechanisms can introduce power disparities between 
different sides, platforms have enacted policy changes to fix the imbalance. Extant literature hasn’t 
studied the unintended consequences of such policy changes. My dissertation seeks to fill this gap 
by examining platforms’ decisions to enact policy/mechanism changes that level the playing field 
by decentralizing choices for different sides. Using empirical studies, my dissertation seeks to 
causally identify the impact of such changes on outcomes for participants as well as for the 
platform.  
The first essay in my dissertation examines the impact Airbnb’s decision to make screening 
optional. There is increasing evidence that two-way screening mechanism has been used as a tool 
by users on the platform to discriminate against some users on the other side. In making screening 
optional, I find that African American hosts and female hosts are more likely to forgo screening 
and they benefit the most (in terms of occupancy, price and/or ratings) from forgoing screening, 
indicating that making screening optional can serve as a useful mechanism in helping alleviate 
reverse discrimination of hosts by guests.  
The second essay studies platforms’ attempts to provide smartphone users with better choice 
over which sensitive information can mobile apps access. In particular, I examine the timing of 
mobile apps' decisions to upgrade to Android 6.0, which restricts the ability of mobile apps from 
seeking blanket permissions to sensitive user information at download, instead requiring them to 
request à la carte permissions at run-time. I find that apps that over-seek (access information that 
are non-essential to their functionality) sensitive information from users strategically delay 
upgrading to Android 6.0. However, these apps suffer popularity and reputational costs in the 
Android marketplace.  
Collectively, the findings in my dissertation provides valuable theoretical as well as practical 
insights about the welfare implications of choice decentralization on all sides in online platforms, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
Over the past two decades, the platform economy has grown from being a blip in the 
radar of digital economies to its de-facto flag bearer. Today, the top 5 US-based 
technology platform economies have a market capitalization of over 5 trillion USD 
(Forbes 2020). With over 170 platform startups with greater than 1 billion USD 
valuation by 2016 (Accenture 2016; Wikipedia 2020), the platform economy is poised 
to be the most sought-after business model for startup ideas. One of the key reasons for 
such an explosive growth of platform economy is the digital platform’s ability to 
provide efficient ways of discovering unfamiliar transacting partners and completing 
transactions (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2003), For example, Airbnb 
efficiently connects house owners/tenants that have spare inventory with others who 
are in need of a space to spend a night. In a way, the features of digital platforms 
democratized the access to markets that were held by institutional players until recently.  
However, a platform’s growth depends not just on bringing together different 
transactional partners and encouraging transactions between them but also on 
guaranteeing fair exchanges on both sides. Asymmetries between participating sides 
may result in consumers’ platform abandonment, especially since competition among 
similar platforms have lowered the switching costs for consumers (Eisenmann et al. 
2011; Patchin and Hinduja 2010). Therefore, it is in the platform’s interest to detect 
and mitigate inadvertent disparities between its various transacting partners, thereby 
ensuring that both the sides are satisfied. 
Platforms have traditionally focused on mitigating frictions and inefficiencies on 
platforms that hinder transactions between the different sides. As a result, platforms 
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have designed mechanisms such as screening or bundling privacy choices, which are 
aimed at encouraging and simplifying transactions between unfamiliar transacting 
partners in platforms. Most of such mechanisms have been designed to enable easy 
onboarding of initial set of users. For example, the ability to screen transacting partners 
allows uninformed participants in the transaction to ascertain quality before 
participating in the transaction (Stiglitz 1977). Especially when platforms such as 
Airbnb or Uber enables inventory sharing with unknown people, allowing users to 
screen seems a required mechanism. Similarly, allowing app users to easily scrutinize 
all the sensitive data that an app accesses before they decide whether or not they want 
to use the app is found to reduce the buyer’s risk perceptions about sellers (Hui et al. 
2007; Malhotra et al. 2004).  
However, over time, platforms have realized that participants may not always 
utilize these mechanisms in a way that such mechanisms were originally intended to. 
Left to the market, some participants from one side of the platform may exploit these 
mechanisms to dominate the other side in transactions. Such a gaming of the system 
would result in imbalances on these platforms that would harm participants as well as 
the platform economy. For example, in online labor platforms, if platform design 
decisions end up shifting market power in favor of the job providers, the market may 
evolve to be inefficient and of low quality (Kingsley et al. 2015). Platform mechanism 
designed to mitigate asymmetric information or to reduce the cost of transaction may 
inadvertently favor the stronger, more established players among sellers, resulting in 
discrimination or strategic retaliation against the less advantaged participants on the 
platform (Edelman and Luca 2014; Klein et al. 2009; Ye et al. 2014). For example, 
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while blanket/bundled permission granting reduces consumers’ cost of individually 
granting them, it ends up limiting their choices and makes it easy to a “valuable” app 
to bulldoze its way through over-accessing users’ sensitive information. Some of the 
disparities have been so acute that they have attracted negative press and/or the 
attention of regulators (Levin 2017; Satariano 2019). 
As a response to media coverages and regulator interventions, platforms have 
recently begun to identify and mitigate such potential disparities by introducing policy 
changes to improve user choices. Such policy changes are usually designed to shift this 
power imbalance towards the traditionally disadvantaged side on platforms. For 
example, when media/academia started highlighting the discrimination that guests 
faced on the platform, Airbnb in enacted multiple policies to prevent the guests being 
discriminated. However, given the multi-sided nature of the platforms, such policy 
changes will invariably have unintended consequences on all sides. Furthermore, given 
that many platforms are making policy changes, a systematic investigation of policy 
changes on all sides of the platform is imperative. However, my literature survey points 
to the lack of such systematic investigations into platforms’ efforts to mitigate potential 
imbalances on platforms.  
My dissertation seeks to address this gap in literature. Specifically, my dissertation 
essays focus on platforms’ decisions to relax, alter or introduce novel mechanisms that 
are aimed at leveling the playing field for the different sides in these platforms. The 
two essays have focused on two distinct online platforms: an exchange platform and a 
smartphone platform. In each of the studies, I identify power-disparities faced by 
participants and the platform’s effort to mitigate this problem by introducing new 
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mechanisms that increases users’ choices. Interestingly, instead of forcing these 
mechanisms on all sellers, platforms introduced these market mechanisms as a choice 
to sellers on the platform. Sellers’ choices here are with respect to whether and/or when 
they would adopt such policies (changes). Hence, my essays also investigate 
antecedents of decisions to adopt these mechanisms, in addition to examining their 
consequences. Then, I employ various well-accepted identification strategies to 
causally identify the impact of such mechanisms on outcomes for participants, as well 
as for the platform. 
The first essay in my dissertation examines the impact of forgoing screening in an 
online sharing platform. Airbnb’s rise in dominance has helped many house owners 
rent out their unutilized inventory for a price. Airbnb is a decentralized platform, in that 
the platform enables guests and hosts to obtain necessary information about each other 
and interact on the platform before mutually agreeing to transact. While this two-way 
screening is assumed an essential mechanism in a decentralized platform, it has also 
raised concerns of increased discriminatory or biased behaviors. Over a third of guest 
requests have been found to be rejected by hosts, resulting in market frictions (Fradkin 
2015). Such excessive vetting also seems to systematically affect ethnic minorities (Cui 
et al. 2020), travelers with disabilities (Ameri et al. 2017), younger guests, or guests 
with children (Karlsson et al. 2017). In 2014, Airbnb introduced a feature called 
“Instant Book” which enables hosts to voluntarily forgo their ability to screen guests. 
Given that only 15 percent of the Airbnb hosts voluntarily opted to forgo screening of 
their guests, I first examine the antecedents of hosts’ decision to forgo screening. 
Equipped with the knowledge of when a listing is more likely to forgo screening, I 
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causally identify the impact of adopting this mechanism on hosts’ outcomes on the 
platform, specifically their occupancy, pricing and rating. I find that listing specific 
characteristics such as falling occupancy or listings with newer hosts are more likely to 
forgo screening. Interestingly, I find that African American hosts and women hosts are 
more likely to forgo screening. I explore and explain the potential reasons why such 
hosts may be more likely to forgo screening. Next, I find that the decision to forgo 
screening pays off economically, with a 13.52% increase in occupancy, an equivalent 
of an increase in revenue averaging $300 per month. However, such an increase comes 
at the cost of a marginal decline in review ratings (a 1.20% drop). I also find significant 
heterogeneity in race and gender regarding the economic benefits of forgoing 
screening. I find that African American hosts and female hosts benefit the most from 
forgoing screening. This study highlights that making screening optional may serve as 
a useful mechanism in helping alleviate reverse discrimination of hosts by guests. This 
study also highlights the importance of understanding the differential effects on 
mechanism designs based on race/ethnicity and gender. 
The second essay studies the impact of Android’s attempt to provide Android users 
with better control over their private information accessed by Android apps. In 
particular, I study apps' decisions to upgrade to Android 6.0, which restricts their ability 
to seek blanket permissions to sensitive user information at download, instead requiring 
them to request à la carte permissions at run-time. Prior to 6.0, the apps were required 
to upfront list all the permissions to access users’ sensitive information before users 
even downloaded the app. While this mechanism reduced the cost of individually 
picking and choosing the permissions, the expectation was that app users would 
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download the app only if they agreed to grant all permissions. However, this hardly 
deterred apps from misusing this mechanism. Firstly, the information overload during 
the disclosure discouraged many users from even reading through the entire list before 
downloading the app. Even if the user reads the list and had to decide between (a) 
granting permissions to access patently non-essential information, and (b) not using the 
app at all, most users would choose the former, especially if the app is “valuable” in 
their mind or does not have an easy substitute. As a result of this choice structure, a 
significant proportion of apps in Android over-seek permissions (i.e., seek more 
permissions than those required for the app’s functionality) (Felt et al. 2011) leading to 
a moral hazard problem. Such permission over-seeking behavior poses security and 
financial risks to users in the platform ecosystem (Sarma et al. 2012; Wei et al. 2012), 
resulting in the erosion of trust on the platform. With Android 6.0, Android allowed 
app users to (a) delay granting permissions until they start using the app and, (b) pick 
and choose which permissions to grant. What is interesting in this setup is that Android 
gave a three-year window for all the apps to upgrade (i.e., target the latest version of 
Android) instead of forcing all apps to upgrade immediately. Hence, in my setup, I 
observe apps’ temporal choice of either upgrading to Android 6.0 immediately, which 
provides mobile apps with the latest platform features, or staying with an earlier 
version, which provides them with better access to users’ sensitive information. By 
utilizing a unique panel dataset of 13,604 most popular apps for 24 months, I find that 
apps that traditionally over-seek permissions strategically delay upgrading. More 
specifically, I find that a key reason why such apps delay upgrading is to continue 
gathering such sensitive information to serve customized and targeted advertisement. 
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Interestingly, such decisions to strategically delay upgrade does not come without a 
consequence. I show that, while such strategic delays enable apps to continue accessing 
sensitive user information for a longer time period, such apps suffer popularity (a fall 
of 9.06% in app’s popularity) and reputational costs (a net rating loss of about 560 
users) in Android Marketplace by delaying upgrade. This research adds to literature on 
mechanism design by showing that carefully designing when (download time vs run-
time) and how (blanket vs individual) users grant permissions improve sellers’ 
information collection behavior and penalizes strategic sellers. 
To summarize, a number of platforms are responding to hot issues (that attract 
media and regulators’ attention) on the platform by introducing policy changes. When 
platforms, particularly the online markets, enact policies that enable individuals on the 
platform to use their own decentralized information, I find that there are welfare 
implications. At the same time, such welfare implications are not only for the side for 
which the policy changes are intended to. I find that the other side of the network is 
also strategic about such change in policies. Therefore, platforms definitely need to 
take the actions of other side into account while implementing policy changes. 
Collectively, the findings in my dissertation provides valuable theoretical as well as 
practical insights about the welfare implications of choice decentralization on all sides 







Chapter 2: Who Forgoes Screening in Online Markets and When? Evidence from 
Airbnb 
2.1. Introduction 
Screening—the vetting of potential trade partners—is a key mechanism to reduce 
information asymmetry frictions and alleviate the “lemons” problem (Akerlof 1970) in 
online peer-to-peer (P2P) markets (e.g., Horton 2017; Iyer et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2013). 
Screening helps determine the trade-worthiness of potential transactional partners by 
examining pertinent information (e.g. profiles, past transaction histories) or through 
direct communication, and to reject transaction requests from questionable parties. For 
example, passengers and drivers alike on Uber (a ridesharing platform) can view ratings 
before accepting a ride; as may chefs and guests on EatWith (a dining experience 
platform) or clients and workers on Upwork (an online labor market platform). Scholars 
note the increased market efficiency due to better matches (Barach 2015; Iyer et al. 
2009), but also provide cautionary evidence of discriminatory/excessive screening by 
one party, say the provider, of the other party, say the client (Cui et al. 2020; Fradkin 
2015; Kanoria and Saban 2017; Pallais 2014; Romanyuk 2016). For example, Cui et 
al. (2020) find that, in the absence of information, Airbnb hosts engage in 
discriminatory screening of guests resulting in guests with African American names 
being less likely to be accepted compared to requests from guests with White names. 
Chan and Wang (2017) show that clients in online labor platforms screen workers by 
gender and are biased towards hiring female workers. 
Left unexamined, however, is the recent popularity of voluntarily forgoing the 
option to screen the other party, even though the other party continues to screen the 
focal party. For example, on the car-sharing platform Turo, car owners can enable the 
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“Instant Book” feature to directly confirm booking requests from travelers. Similarly, 
in online market Dogvacay for home dog boarding services, a dog sitter can enable 
“Instant Book” and automatically approve a guest’s request without having to check 
the guest’s profile and credibility. Despite its increasing usage, we lack systematic 
studies of the phenomenon. When providers forgo such screening, they are forsaking 
the benefits from verification of match quality and increasing the risk of encountering 
lemons. Why, when and who may choose to forgo screening, and what are the resultant 
outcomes of forgoing this option for themselves? I address this research gap in the 
setting of Airbnb—the online lodging marketplace platform—which expanded on its 
traditional mechanisms requiring hosts’ approval of guests’ booking requests (i.e., 
screening is enabled) by popularizing the “Instant Book” feature that allows hosts to 
automatically accept every booking request (i.e., screening is forgone) in 2014. The 
setting enables me to examine the voluntary decision of hosts to switch from traditional 
to instant booking, relate characteristics of market listings and hosts to such behavior, 
and investigate the market performance of the hosts’ listings based on their behavior. 
Specifically, Figure 2.1 depicts my research framework and questions. 
Given that most online P2P markets, and particularly my research context—Airbnb, 
initially offered only the traditional booking option, I treat traditional booking as the 
default norm (i.e., the non-switchers). I ask and answer two research questions: the first 
question (RQ 1) aims to explore the antecedents of forgoing screening for a listing and 
asks, what characteristics of market listings (and the hosts) are associated with the 
likelihood of forgoing screening? The second question (RQ 2) aims for causal 
identification of the consequences of forgoing screening for a listing and asks, how do 
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the market outcomes—occupancy rate, listing price, and review ratings—for a listing 
change after it forgoes screening as compared to a listing that does not? 
Based on a unique panel dataset of all Airbnb listings in New York City between 
August 2015 and February 2017, I conduct a variety of listing-level analyses to answer 
the proposed questions. I employ a logit model to explore what listing conditions and 
host characteristics are associated with a listing’s likelihood of forgoing screening. My 
context represents a self-selected intervention, so I use the common approach of 
propensity score matching (PSM) in conjunction with difference-in-differences (DiD) 
analysis (e.g. Liu and Lynch 2011; Smith and Todd 2005) to causally identify the 
impacts of switching on a listing’s market performance. Using this, I causally estimate 
the impact of forgoing screening on market outcomes through a simultaneous 
estimation system of three equations for a listing’s occupancy rate, price, and ratings.  
To preview my findings, forgoing screening is more likely when listings have lower 
demand, i.e., when listings have mid-level occupancies, face greater recent declines in 
occupancies, and face greater recent declines in price. This provides evidence that 
improving occupancy is one of the major drivers to voluntarily forgo screening. 
Switching to instant booking seems to pay off economically—I find occupancy levels 
increase by an average of 13.52 percent (or 1.79 nights per month) with no change in 
listing price, translating to an average of roughly $300 in increased revenue per month. 
However, this is at the cost of decreased ratings by about 1.20 % (or 1.08 points). 
Underlying the above “average effects” based on demand conditions, I find 
significant heterogeneity in race and gender regarding who is more likely to switch, 
and their associated outcomes. African American hosts are more likely to forgo 
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screening than White hosts are, and they seem to reap higher benefits from doing so 
too. Forgoing screening results in African American hosts experiencing a higher 
percentage improvement in occupancy (18.37% as compared to 14.62% for White 
hosts), with lower declines in review ratings (a 0.28% decline as compared to 1.56% 
drop for White hosts). Turning to gender differences, my results show that female hosts 
are more likely to forgo screening than male hosts are, and they also gain more: listing 
price of a male host decreases by $4.28 relative to a female host; but there are no 
significant differences across gender in either occupancy rates or review ratings.  
In addition to various robustness checks, I also perform falsification tests by 
analyzing Airbnb hosts’ decision to switch back to screening. First, I find that switching 
back to screening is more likely for hosts whose listings experience greater drops in 
ratings from forgoing screening. Second, consistent with my result that African 
American hosts benefit more from increased occupancy from forgoing screening; I find 
that African American hosts are more likely to stay in the Instant Booking state relative 
to White hosts. While women are as likely to stay with Instant Booking as men are, 
African American female and male hosts are more likely to stay with Instant booking 
compared to white female and male hosts respectively. 
Overall, my study highlights when, and for whom, forgoing screening may improve 
market outcomes. In being the first, to the best of my knowledge, to empirically 
examine the role of forgoing screening, my study makes important contributions to the 
literature on mechanism design in online markets and the literature on screening. While 
screening has been traditionally considered a necessity for online P2P markets to 
mitigate issues of information asymmetry, my study shows that forgoing screening can 
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benefit market participants in online markets. My study uncovers heterogeneity in 
response to, and benefits of having the option to choose or forgo screening; this enables 
online market participants to engage in their individual cost-benefit analysis and 
determine how to customize their choices based on demand conditions, and their own 
characteristics.  My study also contributes to the emerging literature on the sharing 
economy by shedding light on mechanism designs in online markets and online sharing 
platforms. While several studies have focused on discrimination of African American 
guests by hosts in online platforms, my study shows that flexibility and options for 
screening can particularly benefit African American and female hosts, who 
traditionally have lower average occupancies and/or price compared to other hosts. In 
doing so, I highlight the importance of understanding the differential effects on 
race/ethnicity and gender in examining the impacts of mechanism design in online 
markets.  
2.2 Theoretical Background 
As backdrop and motivation for my study, I first provide below a focused literature 
review related to two key features of online P2P markets: screening mechanisms for 
addressing information asymmetry, and within-heterogeneity in demand conditions 
facing individual listings (products or services). I then discuss the antecedents and 
consequences of forgoing screening.  
2.2.1  Screening as a Mechanism for Addressing Information Asymmetry in 
Online Markets 
P2P markets are characterized by decentralized transactions, with little opportunity for 
direct contact or extended communication; moreover, most transactions are one-time 
interactions among market participants. Accordingly, information asymmetry is a 
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particularly thorny issue as both sellers and buyers encounter problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Akerlof 1970), and screening is one of the key mechanisms 
to alleviate it.1 
Screening permits an uninformed participant agent to take actions to ascertain the 
quality or type of the potential trade partner involved in a transaction (Stiglitz 1977). 
Two mechanisms of screening under imperfect information are identified in previous 
studies: indirect screening and direct screening (Buchmueller 1995; Hoff and Stiglitz 
1990). Indirect screening refers to the uninformed agent’s practice of offering a menu 
of contracts or options to the trade partner to make her self-reveal her type (Bastani et 
al. 2015). In direct screening, the uninformed agent exerts efforts to actively gather, 
investigate and evaluate information about the trade partner to infer her type (Cornell 
and Welch 1996; Bar-Issac and Cunat 2014). In this study, I focus on direct screening 
which is more often observed in online platforms. Within online P2P markets, direct 
screening mechanisms to help infer the hidden quality of a transactional partner include 
the ability to review and verify potential partner’s information (e.g. Facebook profiles), 
track and analyze past transactional histories, or direct communicate via messaging and 
chat. For example, Airbnb provides various tools for hosts to know a guest, including 
accessing reviews on the guest from other Airbnb members, checking if the guest has 
a verified ID or other identity such as Facebook profile, and private messaging that 
allows hosts to infer the quality of the guest based on textual communication.2 From 
the host’s perspective, these direct screening tools help them avoid lemon guests that 
                                                 
1 Signaling, which permits high quality participants to take actions to signal their quality and thus 
separate themselves from the lemons, is another mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry 




could cause various forms of damages, such as leaving a mess that requires extra 
cleaning from hosts, ignoring the housing rule and causing discomfort to the hosts, and 
leaving unexpected bad views that could hurt future occupancies. Direct screening also 
helps the hosts avoid inconvenience and intangible costs that some guests may cause.3 
For the sake of brevity, hereinafter I refer to direct screening as screening. 
Researchers have documented the use and benefits of screening mechanisms in 
online labor markets where client screening results in higher quality workers and output 
at lower prices (Barach 2015), and in online lending markets where lenders’ screening 
of borrowers based on peer group comparisons mitigates adverse selection (Weiss et 
al. 2010), or lender discernment enables the provision of lower interest rates to 
borrowers who are better credit risks (Iyer et al. 2009). However, scholars have 
cautioned about screening also leading to excessive vetting, resulting in inefficient 
matching between the seller and the buyer. Fradkin (2015) documents increase in 
market frictions on Airbnb because almost a third of buyer requests are potentially 
rejected due to the hosts’ screening. Pallais (2014) shows that inefficient matches 
between clients and workers in online labor market Upwork (used to be called oDesk) 
can be improved if the clients disregard screening and offer inexperienced workers a 
first job. Analytically, both Romanyuk (2016) and Kanoria and Saban (2017) show 
welfare gains from reduction of excessive screening and provide scenarios where some 
ignorance about the buyer’s quality from the seller side may improve the performance 
of matching markets. On a related note, scholars have also documented, from the 
                                                 
3 Even though Airbnb provides insurances for hosts against potential vandalism of their properties, it is 
the host’s responsibility to prove that the damage is caused by the guest. In many cases, it is a time-
consuming process. Such insurances do not cover for nuisance and annoyances that guests may cause to 
hosts and/or other guests sharing the premises. 
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perspective of the party being screened, the negative effects of screening in the form of 
discrimination. For examples, researchers have documented discrimination against 
travelers with disability (Ameri et al. 2017), younger guests and guests with children 
(Karlsson et al. 2017). 
Thus, existing research depicts mixed findings for the use of screening 
mechanisms; while scholars note the beneficial effects of screening for the agent 
engaging in this mechanism, there is evidence against its welfare-enhancing role, 
particularly when taking into account the increased discrimination against the party 
being screened.  
2.2.2  Heterogeneity in Demand Conditions for Listings in P2P Markets  
Even under conditions of perfect information, there is significant heterogeneity in price 
and quality combinations in transactions in P2P markets. Accordingly, in addition to 
overall demand conditions facing all providers of an online listing (product or service), 
individual listings may differ in whether they are in higher or lower demand, and such 
heterogeneity relates to real or perceived differences in quality and price relative to 
alternative options (Dewan and Hsu 2004; Gunter and Onder 2017; Jin and Kato 2006). 
For example, within lodging sharing platforms such as Airbnb—my research context—
while “average” demand for rentals is location and time specific, the characteristics of 
the individual listings—the listing price, amenities, geographical location, etc.—imply 
variation in the specific demand conditions faced by the focal provider. 
In addition to the characteristics of the listing, individual demand could also be 
influenced by host characteristics such as race/ethnicity and gender. Such 
discrimination (statistical or taste based) has been well documented in various studies. 
Studies of labor markets have also found a preference for hiring Whites over hiring 
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African Americans (e.g., Pager et al. 2009; Reimers 1983) resulting in persistent racial 
wage gaps (e.g., Black et al. 2006; Smith 1993). Other studies document African 
Americans receive less favorable treatment—fewer rewards for the same level of 
“good” but more punishments for the same level of “bad”— than Whites (e.g., DeSante 
2013; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2006). An underlying driving factor of such 
discrimination in markets with information asymmetry relates to racialized bias that 
Whites are perceived as more trustworthy and honest than their African American 
counterparts (Doleac and Stein 2013; Mays et al. 2007). In P2P markets specifically, 
studies of baseball card trades note offers received by African American agents were 
inferior relative to Whites agents at shows (List 2004); with 20% reduced prices 
observed in a field experiment on eBay (Ayres et al. 2015).  
Studies of online lodging platforms reveal similar lower prices for equivalent 
listings by African American hosts relative to White hosts (Edelman et al. 2017; Kakar 
et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2015). Within P2P lending platforms, African American 
borrowers are less likely to receive funding (Pope and Sydnor 2011). Discrimination 
can also occur in the other direction (sellers discriminating against buyers). For 
example, Cui et al. (2020) conduct two randomized field experiments on Airbnb; their 
findings reveal racial discrimination by hosts who infer guest quality based on 
race/ethnicity, resulting in lower numbers of requests accepted from African American 
guest names relative to requests from guests with White names.  
Similarly, gender-based prejudice has also been reported in a variety of contexts. 
Gender gaps in economic outcomes, including wage differentials, are consistently 
reported despite the increasing participation of women in the labor force and the 
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strengthening of women’s education background and economic decision-making 
abilities (e.g., Altonji and Blank 1999; Bobbitt-Zeher 2007). Prior field studies have 
also found evidence for price discrimination against women as they may be perceived 
to have lower reservation prices (Ayres and Siegelman 1995).  
In P2P markets specifically, Kricheli-Katz and Regev (2016) analyze over a million 
transactions on eBay to find equally qualified women sellers received fewer bids and 
about 80 cents for every dollar when selling identical new products relative to male 
sellers. Within P2P labor market platforms, male workers are less likely to be 
shortlisted and hired by employers (Chan and Wang 2017). Similarly, Stroube (2017)’s 
study of online lending platforms utilizes an exogenous policy shock to reveal taste-
based bias against women borrowers.  
Thus, in addition to information asymmetry, another important characteristic of 
online P2P markets is the heterogeneity of demand conditions for listings, whether 
driven by listing characteristics or provider characteristics. 
2.2.3  Antecedents and Consequences of Forgoing Screening 
Several gaps emerge from the above literature review. One, the literature on screening 
mechanisms leaves uncontested the implicit assumption that screening is always 
beneficial from the perspective of the party who engages in screening. This runs 
counter to the growing popularity and voluntary willingness to forgo screening in 
online markets. Many online markets, as noted in the introduction, enable an “Instant 
Book” feature, where sellers can select not to engage in screening of buyers. Two, the 
literature on solutions to information asymmetry is not fully integrated with the 
literature on heterogeneity in providers and buyers, even in the presence of full 
information. These studies do not account for the impact of within-heterogeneity of 
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listings on differential use of screening mechanisms among providers. Accordingly, 
studies examining screening mechanisms in P2P markets focus on costs and benefits 
of these on overall market efficiency, or for the other party subject to screening from 
the focal party. To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that examine whether 
forgoing screening can benefit the party choosing to forgo screening, or when and to 
whom such benefits may be greater.  
In this study, I seek to answer when and for whom I am likely to observe forgoing 
of screening, and what are the outcomes of doing so. At the outset, I note several 
boundary conditions. First, I am interested in markets where providers have the option 
of both retaining screening (traditional booking), and forgoing it (instant booking), and 
there are low costs of switching, so providers can switch between maintaining and 
forgoing screening relatively easily.  Second, I focus on the focal provider’s 
perspective, rather than the perspective of market efficiency, or the other party’s 
perspective. Third, I focus on online markets where the other party can continue to 
screen, i.e., the focal provider is still subject to potential buyers screening and 
ascertaining their own trade-worthiness.  
My first research question examines the antecedents of forgoing screening in an 
exploratory manner, seeking to uncover the factors associated with the likelihood of 
forgoing screening. From a focal provider’s perspective, forgoing screening offers the 
benefits of a potential increase in the demand for their listings, because the “Instant 
Book” feature accommodates buyer time and convenience preferences, and may appeal 
to buyers who are in the new market participant segment. However, forgoing screening 
implies an increased risk, and thus cost, of having more potential lower quality buyers. 
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Additionally, lower quality matches absent screening may result in lower ratings or 
reviews, which has the cost of potential lower demand in the future. Thus, when 
deciding on whether to forgo screening, sellers have to assess the benefits and costs 
relative to retaining the option, as it relates to their own specific listing. It stands to 
reason then, that the use of screening mechanisms will have different associated costs 
and benefits for different listings. For listings in demand, the benefits of market 
expansion from forgoing screening are limited. However, for listings with over-
capacity or excess holdings, the benefits of increased demand from a larger pool of 
guests as a consequence of forgoing screening could outweigh the potential increase in 
the costs. Based on this cost-benefit calculus logic, I expect listings that experience 
lower (or declining) individual demand to have higher excess capacity, and thus are 
more likely to forgo screening.  
Equipped with the knowledge of when a listing is more likely to forgo screening, 
my second research question examines the market outcomes associated with forgoing 
screening in a causal manner. Again, consistent with the cost-benefit logic, I expect 
outcomes to be consistent with a “separating equilibrium.” The market outcomes for 
listings and providers will reflect the commensurate benefits and costs, given 
endogenous decision making by providers. I expect that immediate returns—in terms 
of higher occupancy rate would be higher for switchers relative to comparable non-
switchers, but this would be accompanied by lower reviewer ratings and/or lower 
listing prices, reflective of higher costs too.  
As the characteristics of the provider in addition to the characteristics of the listing 
also contribute to the differences in demand conditions they face, the cost-benefit 
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calculus will differ based on these factors. For example, considering that African 
American hosts and female providers face discrimination and consequently lower 
demand in online markets as suggested in prior literature (e.g., Edelman et al. 2017; 
Kakar et al. 2017), they may have more incentives to forgo screening to benefit from a 
larger pool of guests. Therefore, in answering the two research questions, I also 
examine how host gender and race/ethnicity may play a role. 
2.3 Research Context and Data 
I examine the above research questions for the Airbnb platform, the world’s largest 
online marketplace for short-term rentals (WSJ 2017). The platform allows house 
owners (i.e. hosts) with unused space to rent them out to guests who seek 
accommodations. Launched in 2008 in USA, Airbnb now operates in more than 65,000 
cities in over 190 countries, with greater than 3 million active listings.4  While initially 
limited to traditional booking, Airbnb introduced the “Instant Book” option in 2014. 
The traditional booking option represents two-way screening:  the first step is where a 
guest screen across listings and submit a request to the host, the second step is where 
the host screens and either accepts or denies the request.  With “instant booking”, hosts 
voluntarily forgoing their own screening of the guest and eliminate the second step in 
the above process. 
Several elements of this research context make it ideal for my study. First, Airbnb 
is a decentralized P2P platform with participants (hosts and guests) making their own 
choices. This allows me to study the impact of market mechanisms such as “Instant 
Booking” on individual outcomes. Further, switching to “Instant Booking” is relatively 
                                                 
4 See https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us 
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simple and seamless on Airbnb as hosts can set house rules, guest requirements, and 
length of stay, when choosing the “Instant Book” feature. Third, it is worth noting that 
the “Instant Book” feature requires only the hosts to waive their rights to screen their 
guests but allows the guests to continue to search through the listings, screen them and 
shortlist the ones they prefer. Finally, the context suits my data needs: as described in 
greater detail below, the analysis requires data about listing and host characteristics, 
which not only determine their screening choice, but also are also visible to potential 
guests for screening. Additionally, it requires data on outcomes associated with 
choosing to implement or forgo screening, such as subsequent occupancy, price, and 
ratings. 
I compile the data by triangulating across publicly available data on Airbnb and 
proprietary data procured from a business intelligence firm that publishes monthly 
reports on Airbnb for over 100 cities.  My sample consists of all Airbnb listings in the 
New York City (NYC) between August 2015 and February 2017. To ensure 
generalizable implications for a typical and active listing on Airbnb, I exclude listings 
priced above $1,000 a night at any month during the observation window, or listings 
who appear for less than a year5, resulting in 13,757 listings in my panel. It is pertinent 
to note that most listings (about 96%) switch to instant booking at most once; only less 
than 4% of all listings switch to instant booking twice or more. This suggests that 
forgoing screening is not a period-by-period decision for most hosts. Instead, hosts 
prefer to stay with either traditional booking or instant booking, whichever works better 
for them based on their individual cost-benefit calculus. Consistent with my research 
                                                 
5 Listings that are priced at over $1000 per night are very rare and often accommodate exceptional 
guests with special needs (e.g., party). Therefore, we exclude such atypical listings from my sample. 
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questions, the data permit me to differentiate across two groups of listings: (1) listings 
that always stay in the traditional booking status; (2) listings that are initially in 
traditional booking, but later switch to instant booking (i.e., switchers). These two 
categories constitute 96% of all listings; traditional booking represents the dominant 
choice, and instant booking represents 16% of the listings in my sample. While my 
definition of switchers includes listings that switch back to traditional booking later on, 
I only include their observations prior to switching back in the main analyses while 
ensuring robustness of my results in additional tests without such listings. Particularly 
of note is the very small count of 533 listings that forgo screening right from the onset. 
While I exclude these observations in the main analyses, I ensure robustness of my 
findings by including them in additional tests. My final data as described above, results 
in 196,155 listing-month observations in the main analyses. For each listing, I have 
time varying information about its characteristics (e.g., cancellation policy, room type, 
number of photos, etc.), as well as characteristics of the host (gender/race, Superhost 
designation6, year of entry into Airbnb, displayed name, displayed picture, etc.). I also 
have information on the local competition (e.g., number of competing listings in the 
same neighborhood, number of Superhosts in the same neighborhood, etc.), and data 
on the listing’s monthly outcomes (listing price, occupancy rate, review ratings). 
2.3.1  Variable Definitions 
Table 2.1 provides a detailed description of the variables used in the major analysis. 
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix are provided in Appendix Tables A1 
and A2.  
                                                 
6 On Airbnb, hosts who honor their booking reservations with at least 10 accommodations, 90% 
response rate, and 80% 5-star reviews are list as Superhosts (see https://www.airbnb.com/superhost) 
23 
 
Dependent Variables: The first dependent variable—the choice of forgoing screening 
is coded as a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the listing is available for 
instant booking, and 0 if the listing has a traditional booking status.  The other three 
variables measuring outcomes relate to the occupancy rate, price and the reviewer 
rating of the listing. I measure the occupancy ratio as the fraction of days the listing 
was booked (occupied) relative to the number of days the listing was made available in 
Airbnb. The price is based on the listing price in US dollars for the listing-month 
observation, and reviewer ratings are obtained for each month for each of the listings 
in Airbnb. On average, a listing is made available for booking 24.5 days per month, its 
listing price is $167.87, and its monthly occupancy rate is 0.54 (or 0.54*24.5=13.23 
nights). 
Independent Variables: The key independent variables include listing specific 
variables representing its demand conditions, and host specific variables. In particular, 
prior levels and changes in occupancy rates, price and rating reflect the demand 
conditions specific to the listing, after accounting for many controls as listed below and 
in Table 1. The host specific variables include dummies that indicate if the host is a 
Superhost, or if the host is professional. 8  I measure host tenure as the number of days 
since the host has registered on Airbnb. For each host, I determine the race/ethnicity 
and gender as described in the section below. I include variables that capture local 
competition by using the similar listings panel present for each of the listings (12 
similar listings per panel). Finally, listing specific control variables include review 
count, cancellation policy, type of listing (one of shared room, private room or entire 
property), minimum nights that a guest needs to book the place for, count of photos, 
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and popularity of listing (measured as the count of competition listings in which the 
focal listing appears in the similar listings panel).  
Chief among the host variables are the race/ethnicity and gender. I ensured 
accuracy of race/ethnicity, and gender classification of the hosts based on inspection of 
profiles displayed on Airbnb. The race/ethnicity categories include White, African 
American, Asian, Hispanic, and uncertain (e.g., the host name is uninformative such as 
A.J and the profile picture is obscure and only shows the back of a person). The three 
gender categories include male, female, and uncertain (e.g., the host name is in 
abbreviations such as D.J. and the profile picture does not show any face). I coded the 
data manually, given the advantage of the manual coding approach over the algorithmic 
approach for identifying stylized names (e.g., @m@nd@ instead of Amanda) and low-
quality photos (e.g., caricatured/tilted/side profile photos). Further, I validated the 
accuracy of the manually coded host race/ethnicity and gender labels by randomly 
selecting 20% of the sample and cross-validating the labels with those predicted by 
computer algorithms (Ambekar et al. 2009; Chan and Wang 2017; Yang et al. 2006). I 
combined two algorithmic approaches when doing so, the first relies on predictive 
models based on host names7, and the second relies on predictions using host pictures 
through facial recognition algorithms.8 Neither algorithm is necessarily superior to the 
                                                 
7 Algorithmic approaches to predict host race/ethnicity and gender based on host names infer 
probabilities from classifiers based on Hidden Markov Models and decision trees (Ambekar et al. 2009). 
For race/ethnicity, consistent with Pool et al. (2015), I assign a race/ethnicity category to a host if the 
probability of the host name belonging to that category is at least 85% and mark the host race/ethnicity 
as uncertain if otherwise. I find no occurrence of cases of categorizing a name as belonging to two or 
more races/ethnicities (i.e., the probability of a name belonging to two races/ethnicities is at least 85%) 
in my dataset. For gender, following prior studies (e.g., Chan and Wang 2017; Tang et al. 2011), I match 
the host’s first name to a database of first names with annotated genders constructed from public 
Facebook profile pages of 1.67 million users in NYC to algorithmically identify the gender of a host. 
8 Algorithmic approaches to infer host race/ethnicity and gender based on extracted facial features (e.g., 
eyebrow thickness, hair color, etc.) use profile pictures and employ computer vision and machine 
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other for revealing information about race/ethnicity and gender, which is why I 
combined both and designate the race/ethnicity and gender of a host as algorithmically 
identified if the labels generated by the two algorithms match and are marked as 
uncertain if otherwise. My cross-validation between manually coded labels and 
algorithm generated labels yields an agreement of 93.75% for host race/ethnicity and 
an agreement of 99.46% for host gender. These high levels of agreements provide 
confidence in my use of manual coding; in additional robustness tests, I ensure the 
findings are consistent across each type of approach (manual coding; name-based 
inference and picture-based inference) and their combinations.  
Table 2.2 shows the distributions of host race/ethnicity and host gender in my 
sample. 55.73% of the hosts are White, and 12.44% of the hosts are identified as 
African American. This distribution is consistent with prior studies which show that 
Airbnb is predominated by White hosts overall (e.g., Edelman et al. 2017), and in New 
York City neighborhoods (Cox 2017). The ratio of female hosts to male hosts based on 
identified gender is about 53:47. Again, this distribution is fairly consistent with prior 
studies documenting that females account for roughly 55% of the Airbnb host 
community (e.g., Airbnb 2017; Mohlmann 2015).     
2.4 Analyses and Results 
2.4.1  When and Who Chooses to Forgo Screening? 
To examine the factors that influence the voluntary choice of forgoing screening—my 
first research question—I use the following logit model: 
                                                 
learning techniques. Following prior studies (e.g. Chan and Wang 2017; Yang et al. 2006), I utilize a 
neural network trained facial recognition API to infer the race/ethnicity and gender of a host. 
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*Δoccupancyit-1 + c4*priceit-1 + c5*ratingit-1 + c6*host_controlsit + 
c
7
*listing_controlsit + c8*competitor_controlsit + c9*month_dummyt + εit 
(2.1) 
where the subscript i indexes the listings and the subscript t indexes the months. 
Behaviorally, equation (2.1) models a listing’s decision of switching from the initial 
traditional booking status to instant booking status during my observation period. As 
noted earlier, despite that in theory a host could forgo screening at any given time, in 
practice most listings do not frequently switch back and forth between screening and 
forgoing screening. Instead, they switch to instant booking at most once. In this case, 
the choice of forgoing screening is irrelevant once a listing has already switched. 
Therefore, following prior research (e.g., Gopal and Gao 2009; King et al. 2005), I drop 
observations related to a listing from the analysis after the listing has switched to instant 
booking. As argued earlier, the cost-benefit calculus of forgoing screening for a listing 
is related to the listing’s demand situation such that lower (or declining) demand is 
associated with a higher likelihood of forgoing screening due to a higher chance that 
the received benefits of increased occupancy can outweigh the cost of reduced quality 
of guests. Therefore, I model a listing’s decision to switch to instant booking in month 
t to be affected by its occupancy in the previous month t-1 and its recent change in 
occupancy from month t-2 to month t-1. I also include a quadratic form of occupancyit-
1 to detect possible curvilinear relationship between occupancyit-1 and the propensity to 
switch to instant booking. In addition, I control for the other market performance 
indicators of the listing such as price and review rating in the previous month and their 
recent changes. I note that while my main analysis focuses on the prior period, 
additional robustness checks confirm results are qualitatively similar when the levels 
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and changes are computed in the prior periods ranging from three to six months. My 
choice of the prior period is to minimize the loss of observations due to differencing. I 
control for several variables that might also drive a host’s decision to forgo screening, 
such as: (1) host tenure—novice hosts may use instant booking to learn to evaluate the 
quality of guests, (2) if the host is a professional host—professional hosts like hotels 
are used to the practice of not screening guests, (3) number of competitors in the 
neighborhood that have forgone screening—competitive pressure may force a host to 
mimic her competitors, and (4) minimum number of stay—a listing with a higher 
threshold for minimum number of stay may be more concerned about possible lemon 
guests. I also control for seasonality by including month fixed effects in the model. 
Given my interest in exploring how host gender and race/ethnicity may be associated 
with the decision to forgo screening, I do not include host fixed effects.  
The results are shown in Table 2.3. The coefficients of occupancyit-1 is 
significant and positive, and the coefficient of the quadratic form of occupancyit-1 is 
significant and negative. These results suggest that having mid-level occupancy levels 
is positively associated with the likelihood of forgoing screening for a listing. The 
coefficient of Δoccupancyit-1 is significant and negative, indicating that experiencing 
recent declines in occupancies is positively associated with the likelihood of forgoing 
screening for a listing. Similarly, the coefficient of Δpriceit-1 is significant and negative, 
suggesting that there is a positive association between experiencing recent price 
declines and the likelihood of forgoing screening for a listing.  
In terms of host-related controls, I find that being a “professional host” (i.e., a 
host with three or more listings in NYC, typically a traditional bed and breakfast place) 
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is positively associated with the likelihood of forgoing screening. I also find being 
relatively new to the platform or non-Superhosts has a positive association with the 
likelihood of forgoing screening, as seen by the negative and significant coefficients of 
host_tenureit and host_is_superhostit. I also find that having a higher threshold for 
minimum number of stays and thereby greater concern about potential lemon guests is 
positively associated with the likelihood of forgoing screening, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient of min_stayit. 9 In terms of competitor-related 
controls, I obtain a positive & significant coefficient of competitor_instant_bookableit. 
I present the full model containing the effects of host race/ethnicity and host gender 
in column (2) of Table 2.3. I find African American hosts have a higher likelihood of 
forgoing screening as indicated by the significant and positive coefficient of African 
Americani, while White hosts are less likely to forgo screening as indicated by the 
significant and negative coefficient of Whitei. In addition, female hosts have a higher 
likelihood of forgoing screening than male hosts as indicated by the significant and 
negative coefficient of malei. I also conduct additional sub-sample analyses (see 
Appendix Table A3) and find that among females, African American females are more 
likely to forgo screening than White females and among males, African American 
males are more likely to forgo screening than White males. Finally, in unreported tests, 
I conduct two additional tests using alternative estimation models and samples: a linear 
probability model, and by including observations of listings after forgoing screening 
and treating the decision as a period-to-period decision. I obtain consistent results.  
                                                 
9 In additional analyses, I find that: (1) overall a host does not change minimum_stay in 86.76% of the 
months; (2) listings with lower occupancy rates are not different from listings with higher occupancy 
rates in terms of adjusting minimum_stay. These results help rule out the alternative explanation that 
hosts adjust minimum_stay as a strategic response to lower occupancy rates. 
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2.4.2  Impacts of Forgoing Screening 
2.4.2.1 Difference-in-Differences Estimation Model 
To answer my second research question examining the impact of forgoing screening 
on a listing’s market performance, I adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) model, 
which is commonly used to infer the causal effect of a “treatment” on the treated 
(Meyer 1995). In my case, the treated are the listings that have switched to instant 
booking (as compared to the control group of listings that stay in the traditional booking 
mode). Given the treatment in my context is staggered as each treated listing may 
switch at different times, I follow prior research (e.g., Autor 2003; Fang et al. 2014; 
Gao and Zhang 2016) and normalize the time dimension: For each treated listing, I set 
the month it received treatment to time 0, with months in the pre-treatment period in 
reverse chronological order denoted as month -1, -2, etc. and months in the post-
treatment period sequentially denoted as month 1, 2, etc.  
There are three key threats to inference to address in my DiD estimation 
approach.  First, who receives the treatment is non-random, as discussed above in my 
first research question, so I need to address the selection bias in who receives the 
treatment. Approaches to addressing this issue include matching a control group with 
the treated group (Abadie 2005), using matching methods such as propensity score 
matching, which have been employed in various non-experimental settings when the 
assignment of treatment is not controlled by the researcher (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). 
Propensity score matching (PSM) has been frequently used in combination with DiD 
analysis for causal inference of the effect of a non-exogenous intervention (e.g. Liu and 
Lynch 2011; Smith and Todd 2005). Therefore, following the PSM method and taking 
into account the dynamic timing of treatment across listings, I first predict the 
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propensity score of a listing receiving the treatment at the observed treatment month 
(e.g., June 2016) using a logit regression on key observable covariates (i.e., time-
variant covariates such as occupancy level, listing price, review rating, host tenure and 
number of reviews, and time-invariant covariates such as listing type and listing 
location) in the month prior to the treatment (e.g., May 2016).10 I also ensure each 
matched listing is within a three-mile radius of the treated listing (calculated based on 
the zip codes of listings) to further eliminate any difference caused by geographic areas. 
To minimize the bias in the estimated treatment effect, for every treated listing I apply 
one-to-one nearest neighbor matching without replacement on the propensity score to 
identify a matched control listing that is used as a match only once (Austin 2010).11 A 
covariate balance check shown in Appendix Table A1 provides evidence that a treated 
listing and a control listing are similar in all covariates after PSM despite their 
significant differences before matching. 
I further check if the distributions of host race/ethnicity and of host gender remain 
consistent after the propensity score matching. As shown in Table 2.4, the pre-matching 
distribution of host race/ethnicity is comparable to the post-matching distribution of 
host race/ethnicity. Similarly, the distribution of host gender remains qualitatively 
unchanged after the matching. These results suggest that the sample after matching is 
                                                 
10 I additionally perform two additional robustness checks to ensure that my results are not biased by the 
choice of covariates in PSM.  First, I use the historical average of non-cumulative time-variant covariates 
(i.e., listing price, listing occupancy, number/count of ratings per month) in all months prior to the 
treatment month for the propensity score matching. Second, we introduce more covariates in the 
propensity score matching, including host race/ethnicity, host gender, number of listing photos, listing 
popularity, the host’s Superhost status, and if the host is a professional host. In both cases, even though 
the matched sample of treated listings and control listings are different, we obtain consistent results in 
all the major analyses. 
11 The common support condition is validated and enforced as a significant overlap of propensity scores 
between the treated group and the untreated group is observed. 
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representative of hosts of various races/ethnicities and genders in the overall sample. 
Furthermore, treated and control listings are similar in terms of host race/ethnicity 
distribution and host gender distribution, providing further confidence on the validity 
of the sample used in the analysis. The matching procedure results in a sample of 1945 
treated listing out of 2314 available treated listings and 1945 matched listings in the 
control group that is used for the DiD model as shown below. 12 
occupancyit = α0 + α1* priceit + α2* ratingit-1 + α3* average_occupancyit-1 + 
α
4
* post_switcht + α5* inst_book_groupi*post_switcht + α6* host_controlsi 
+ α
7
* listing_controlsit + α8* month_dummyt +wi + εit  
(2.2) 
priceit = β0 + β1*average_occupancyit-1 + β2*ratingit-1   + β3*post_switcht + 
β4*inst_book_groupi*post_switcht + β5*host_controlsi + β6 * 
listing_controlsit + β7* month_dummyt + wi + ηit  
(2.3) 
ratingit = γ0 + γ1* priceit + γ2* occupancyit + γ3* post_switcht + 
γ
4
*inst_book_groupi * post_switcht + γ5* ratingit-1 + γ6* host_controlsi + γ7* 
listing_controlsit + γ8* month_dummyt + wi + θit    
(2.4) 
In the above model, inst_book_groupi is a dummy variable indicating if listing i is 
in the treated group (inst_book_groupi=1) or in the control group 
(inst_book_groupi=0). The dummy variable post_switcht denotes post-switching period 
vs. pre-switching period (post_switcht=1 if t>0 and 0 if t<0 for every treated listing and 
its matched control listing). The term wi captures time-invariant listing fixed effects 
and month_dummyt captures seasonality effects.
13 Equation (2.2) specifies the 
occupancy of listing i in month t is affected by its price in the same month, review 
rating score and average occupancy before month t. Because a listing’s price is 
                                                 
12 Of the 369 treated samples that are not matched, 144 listings are removed for not being on common 
support and another 225 listings are dropped due to failure of getting a match. 
13 month_dummyt captures fixed effects related to month (e.g., January vs. February vs. March). While 
January may be a pre-treatment month for some listings that switched later, it may be a post-treatment 
month for other listings that switched earlier. Therefore, introducing month_dummyt does not lead to 
dropping post_switcht from the model. 
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typically set up by the host on a month-by-month basis in advance, I specify that the 
price of listing i in month t is affected by its lagged average occupancy and rating score 
in equation (2.3). Finally, considering that ratingit measures the cumulative review 
rating of listing i by the end of month t, in equation (2.4) I model it as a function of its 
starting value before month t (ratingit-1) as well as other factors such as the listing’s 
price and occupancy in month t that could affect newly obtained ratings. In addition, I 
control for several time-varying variables that could affect a listing’s performance. For 
example, a listing with more cumulative number of reviews by the previous month 
(review_countit-1) may be perceived as more reliable by guests, leading to higher 
occupancy and the host’s ability to charge a higher price in the current month. But 
meanwhile, the associated higher expectations from the guests may cause the rating of 
the listing to drop down in the current month. The major coefficients of interest are α
4
, 
β4, and γ4, which measure the causal impact of forgoing screening on a listing’s 
occupancy, price, and review rating respectively. 
Second, a key assumption of the DiD estimation is that the control and treated 
groups have a similar time trend in the absence of the treatment. To test the parallel 
trend assumption, I follow prior research (e.g., Autor 2003; Ryan et al. 2015) and model 
the time trends of a listing’s performance by introducing interactions of the treatment 
indicator and various time dummies as shown below: 
occupancyit = α0 + α1*priceit + α2*ratingit-1 + α3*average_occupancyit-1 
+α
4
*host_controlsi + α5*listing_controlsit + α6*month_dummyt + 
∑𝛼𝑗
𝑝
*inst_book_groupi*relative_monthj + wi + εit  
(2.5) 
priceit = β0 + β1*average_occupancyit-1 + β2*ratingit-1  + β3*host_controlsi + 
β4* listing_controlsit + β5* month_dummyt + 
∑𝛽𝑗
𝑝




ratingit = γ0 + γ1*priceit + γ2*occupancyit + γ3*ratingit-1 + γ4*host_controlsi 
+ γ
5
*listing_controlsit + γ6* month_dummyt + 
∑𝛾𝑗
𝑝
*inst_book_groupi*relative_monthj + wi + θit    
(2.7) 
where, relative_monthj is a dummy for each month j relative to the treatment 
month 0. Appendix Table A4 presents the estimation results. An F-test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that all the pre-treatment coefficients are jointly zero, providing 
support for the parallel trend assumption.  
Finally, a third challenge to my estimation is simultaneity in the determination 
of occupancy, price and review ratings. Given that endogenous dependent variables 
such as occupancyit and priceit also enter the estimation equations on the right hand 
side and the three error terms may be correlated with each other due to unobservable 
common factors related to a listing, I simultaneously estimate the three equations by 
employing the three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach which has been commonly 
used in estimating a system of equations in similar situations  (e.g., Aral et al. 2018; 
Chang and Gurbaxani 2013; Roberts and Schlenkera 2013; Xue et al. 2012). In 
economic theory, it is reasonable to assume that competing products’ characteristics 
have no direct impact on a consumer’s utility for a product but may directly affect the 
characteristics of the product, which are endogenously decided based on competitions 
(Berry et al. 1995). Similarly, Hausman (1996) argues that the variations in the 
equivalent characteristics of competitors or neighbors should correlate with the focal 
player’s characteristics but would only affect other characteristics of the focal player 
indirectly. Echoing these studies, Reynaert and Verboven (2014) discuss and establish 
why competitors’ characteristics are valid instruments for the focal player’s price. 
Therefore, a variety of studies have used the characteristics of competing products as 
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instrument variables, sometimes referred to as Hausman type instruments, for a 
product’s endogenous characteristics (e.g., Aral et al. 2018; Cachon et al. 2019; Fan 
2013; Ghose and Han 2014; Hong and Pavlou 2016; Xue et al. 2012). Following the 
same approach, I use the average price of a listing’s 12 local competitors as an 
instrument for priceit. Similarly, I use the average occupancy of a listing’s closest local 
competitors as an instrument for occupancyit.
14 
2.4.2.2 Estimation Results 
The outcomes of the DiD estimation are presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5. In 
terms of control variables, I observe positive and significant coefficients of 
review_countit-1 in the occupancy and price equations. However, review_countit-1 has a 
negative and significant influence on a listing’s rating. In addition, the coefficient of 
host_is_professionalit is positive and significant in the price equation, indicating that 
professional hosts that are experienced in the hospitality business such as hotels 
generally charge higher price than non-professional hosts do. 
More importantly, I find that forgoing screening significantly improves the 
monthly occupancy level of a listing by 13.52% (α
4
=0.073, 0.073/0.54=13.52%) or 
about 1.79 nights (0.073*24.5=1.79), as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction term inst_book_groupi*post_switcht. Such an increase in 
occupancy improves the revenue of the host by an average of $300.23 
                                                 
14 The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is 93.26 (p<0.001) in the occupancy equation and 143.53 
(p<0.001) in the rating equation, providing evidence for instrument relevance. The Cragg-Donald Wald 
F statistic is 13541.68 in the occupancy equation and 60.96 in the rating equation, exceeding the 
recommended Stock-Yogo critical value for 10% maximal IV size in each equation and thus providing 
support that my instruments are not weak. In unreported results, we also use the lagged value of the 
endogenous variables as excluded instrument variables (e.g., Xue et al. 2012; Chang and Gurbaxani 




(1.7885*$167.87=$300.23) per month. Second, I find that the price of a listing does 
not change after the host forgoes screening. However, the review rating of the listing 
falls by 1.078 points or 1.20% (-1.078/89.55=-1.20%) after forgoing screening, as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the causal impacts of forgoing screening based on the DiD 
estimation results: compared to the matched control listings, the treated listings have a 
significant increase in the average predicted occupancy, negligible change in the 
average predicted listing price, and a salient decrease in the average predicted rating.  
To investigate whether the impacts of forgoing screening depend on host 
race/ethnicity or gender, I add the three-way interaction terms 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*race/ethnicityi and inst_book_groupi*post_switcht* 
genderi to the DiD estimation model. The baseline comparison groups are hosts whose 
race/ethnicity are unidentified in terms of host race/ethnicity, and female hosts in terms 
of host gender, respectively. The main results with both moderating effects included is 
presented in Table 2.6. The coefficients of the three-way interaction terms for African 
American hosts and for White hosts are insignificant in both occupancy and price 
equations. Considering the lower monthly occupancy of African American hosts before 
they forgo screening (see Appendix Table A2), African American hosts have a higher 
percentage of occupancy improvement (0.079/0.43=18.37%) than White hosts 
(0.079/0.54=14.62%). In the equation for review rating, the coefficient of the three-
way interaction term is significant with a magnitude of 1.149 for African American 
hosts but is insignificant for White hosts. These results indicate that African American 
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hosts incur a lower cost to reap the higher percentage of occupancy improvement—on 
average, they experience a 1.149 points or 1.28% lower decline in review ratings 
(0.28% decline for African American hosts versus 1.56% decline for White host). 
Turning to the moderating effects of host gender in Table 6, I focus on the three-way 
interaction terms involving host gender, where the baseline comparison group is female 
hosts. The coefficient of the three-way interaction term for male hosts is only 
significant in the price equation with a magnitude of -4.280 (p=0.001). This indicates 
the listing price of a male host decreases by $4.28 compared to a female host; but there 
are no significant differences in either occupancy rates or review ratings across gender. 
In unreported results, I obtain consistent results when examining the moderating role 
of host race/ethnicity and host gender independently. 
Figure 2.3 highlights the outcome heterogeneity on top of the average effects 
of forgoing screening based on the DiD estimation results. It shows that: the average 
predicted price of a male host’s listing decreases as compared to that of a female host’s 
listing; and the average predicted listing rating drops less for African American hosts 
than for White hosts. 
2.4.2.3 Uncovering What Drives Outcome Heterogeneity 
What drives such heterogeneity in outcomes? I examine if the differential 
benefits and costs of forgoing screening for White hosts as compared to African 
American hosts can be explained by their differences in quality as reflected in review 
ratings and comments.15 As shown in Table 2.7, among switchers, African Americans 
are not different from White hosts despite that White hosts in general have higher 
                                                 
15 We focus on listings that have comments in both pre-switching and post-switching periods and have 
a minimum of 5 comments so that we could reliably analyze their textual comments. 
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review ratings.  This suggests that White switchers are of lower relative quality (vis-à-
vis an average White hosts) than African American switchers (vis-à-vis an average 
African American hosts). I also analyze the textual review comments received by hosts. 
For each comment, I identify the sentences with positive sentiment as positive 
mentions, and sentences with negative sentiment as complaints that are further 
classified into various categories 16 (e.g., complaints about room, complaints about 
noise, complaints about location, etc.). As shown in Table 7, there are no significant 
differences between African American hosts and White hosts in positive mentions per 
comment and negative complaints per comment before they forgo screening. After 
switching to the forging screening state, both African American and White hosts suffer 
from reduced positive mentions in the review comments. However, African American 
hosts have higher positive mentions per comment than White hosts while their 
differences in complaints remain insignificant. These findings are consistent with my 
DiD estimation result that the cost of decreased ratings for African American hosts is 
lower. Overall, the analyses on review ratings and comments provide evidence that the 
quality of African American switchers (relative to an average African American host) 
is higher than White switchers (relative to an average White host). This quality 
difference enables African American hosts to reap more benefits from forgoing 
screening at lower costs than White hosts. 
                                                 
16 For this, we first select 1600 comments left by guests, while ensuring that host gender and 
race/ethnicity are balanced. We then manually tag the 9925 individual statements from these comments 
as either positive mentions or complaints. Furthermore, we categorize the identified complaints into 6 
major types. We then train a LSTM (long short-term memory) based Recurrent Neural Network to 
classify individual statements. A 10-fold cross validation gives over 90% accuracy of my classification. 
We then employ this trained model to detect complaints and positive mentions in over 491,000 comments 
left by guests for the hosts in my sample. 
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To further understand why female hosts and male hosts are similarly affected 
by forgoing screening except for differences in listing price change, I compare their 
quality and listing prices before forgoing screening. The results are shown in Table 2.8. 
I find that overall female and male hosts are of similar quality; however, female hosts 
that forgo screening have, on average, a higher rating than male hosts that forgo 
screening. A comparison of the listing prices of female switchers and male switchers 
at various occupancy ranges shows that female hosts have consistently lower listing 
prices, albeit having better ratings, than male hosts. This result echoes prior studies on 
gender gap in online markets, which suggest that female sellers suffer from lower prices 
than male sellers (e.g., Kricheli-Katz and Regev 2016). Taken together, the results 
suggest that due to their lower quality than female switchers, male switchers would 
have smaller improvement in occupancy and greater decrease in ratings after forgoing 
screening. However, this is offset by male switchers’ act of lowering listing prices after 
forgoing screening. As a result, I observe similar changes in occupancy and ratings 
across the two genders but a drop in listing price for male switchers as compared to 
female switchers. 
2.4.3  Falsification Tests 
Overall, my analyses suggest that: (1) one major reason for hosts to voluntarily forgo 
screening is to improve listing occupancy, albeit at the cost of lower review ratings; 
and (2) White hosts incur higher costs and improve the occupancy levels of their 
listings less than African American hosts after forgoing screening. Following the same 
cost-benefit calculus logic, these results imply that listings with higher costs of forgoing 
screening and listings by White hosts are more likely to switch back to the screening 
state. Therefore, as a falsification test, I also examine which listings among switchers 
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are more likely to switch back to traditional screening (which I call two-way switchers), 
relative to continuing with forgoing screening. The sample for this analysis includes 
observations for all switchers after they have forgone screening. To account for the fact 
that the value of the dependent variable (traditional_bookableit) will always be 1 after 
a two-way switcher has switched back to traditional booking, I also only keep two-way 
switchers’ observations in the month of switching back while dropping their 
observations afterwards. Formally, I model the decision to switch back a listing to 
traditional booking as: 
Logit(traditional_bookableit) = π0+ π1*occupancy_change_percentit-1 + 
π
2
*price_change_percentit-1 + π3*rating_change_percentit-1 + 
π
4
*host_controlsit + π5*listing_controlsit + π6*competitor_controlsit + 
π
7
*month_dummyt + εit    
(2.8) 
Similar to equation (2.1), here I model a listing’s decision to switch back to 
traditional booking in month t as a function of variables measuring how much a listing 
has benefited from forgoing screening, including change in occupancy 
(occupancy_change_percentit-1), change in listing price (price_change_percentit-1), and 
change in cumulative review rating (rating_change_percentit-1), and other host-related 
and listing-related variables.  
I report the estimation results in Appendix Table A5. I observe insignificant 
coefficients of occupancy_change_percentit-1 and price_change_percentit-1 in column 
(1). However, I find that the coefficient of rating_change_percentit-1 is significant and 
negative, suggesting that listings that experience greater drops in rating due to forgoing 
screening are more likely to re-enable screening. Overall, the results suggest no 
discernable differences effects of occupancy and price changes, but listings that 
experience a higher drop in review ratings and thus incur a higher cost from forgoing 
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screening are more likely to switch back to screening.  
African American hosts, I find, have a lower propensity to re-enable screening as 
compared to White hosts. This result, along with finding on rating_change_percentit-1 
(that listings with higher drop in ratings are more likely to re-enable screening), 
confirms my conjecture and provides further support for the main findings regarding 
the antecedents and consequences of forgoing screening. I find no significant difference 
between female hosts and male hosts in their propensities to re-enable screening. 
However, in additional sub-sample analyses (see columns (2) and (3) of Appendix 
Table A5) I find that among females, African American females are more likely to 
continue to forgo screening than White females. Similarly, among males, African 
American males are more likely to stay with forgoing screening than White males. 
2.5  Discussion  
2.5.1  Key Findings and Discussion 
Motivated by the growing implementation of the forgoing screening mechanism in 
online P2P markets and a dearth of research examining when and who is likely to do 
so, and what are the resultant outcomes, this study offers a concerted and systematic 
empirical investigation into these questions in the context of Airbnb, a popular P2P 
sharing platform. The findings are summarized in Table 2.9. I find demand conditions 
facing individual listings are associated with this choice: when listings experience mid-
level or declining occupancies, the expected benefits of forgoing screening seem to 
outweigh the expected costs in the decision-making calculus and such listings are more 
likely to forgo screening. This is also true for listings with higher local competition, 
and for listings where the local competitors have forgone screening, suggesting that 
listings may forgo screening due to competitive pressure. Host characteristics also 
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matter. Supply characteristics of hosts affect the choice: new entrants on the Airbnb 
platform and non-superhosts are also more likely to forgo screening. These results 
suggest that inexperienced hosts may leverage instant booking to learn evaluating the 
quality of guests. I also find that professional hosts are more likely to forgo screening, 
probably because those professional hosts are used to and comfortable with the practice 
of not screening their guests. Importantly, and consistent with the literature on 
discrimination and bias, I find non-economic characteristics of hosts such as 
race/ethnicity and gender are associated with forgoing of screening: African American 
hosts, and female hosts are more likely to forgo screening.  
The outcomes associated with a choice to forgo screening are consistent with the 
expected costs and benefits. Occupancy rates indeed increase for listings with no 
associated changes in price, thus increasing the total revenue for the listing. However, 
as would be expected given that providers open the possibility of renting to unknown 
and potentially low-quality guests, or to less well-matched guests, the reviewer ratings 
also decline after forgoing screening. Importantly, I find African American hosts 
benefit in terms of greater percentage increases in occupancy rates, and also pay lower 
penalty in terms of smaller declines in review ratings, relative to White hosts. This is 
mainly because African American switchers are of higher quality than White switchers 
among their same-race pool of hosts. In addition, while female hosts are no different 
from male hosts in terms of changes in occupancy rates or review ratings, they do not 
suffer from the cost of decreased listing price as male hosts who are of worse quality. 
Thus, the benefits of forgoing screening accrue disproportionally more for African 
American and/or female hosts. Given guests are most likely aware of hosts’ 
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ethnicity/gender based on their profile photos, this suggests that guests seem to tradeoff 
their taste-based bias for the added convenience of instant booking.  
2.5.2  Limitations and Future Research 
I acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, similar to prior research on 
Airbnb (e.g., Edelman and Luca 2014), my sample consists of all Airbnb listings in 
New York City within a specific timeframe (i.e., from August 2015 to February 2017). 
While New York City represents the largest locale in terms of active US Airbnb 
listings, surpassing the next biggest city Los Angeles by 55% more rental supply, 
generalizability concerns limit applying the findings of this study to other cities, 
particularly international locations where there may be significant differences in socio-
economic characteristics. We need additional studies across locations to verify 
consistent findings, or identify contingency factors affecting the relationships I 
document. In particular, future studies could compare New York City with another city 
for which the “Instant Book” feature was popularized at a different time to further 
explore how the availability or adoption of forgoing screening exerts influences. 
Similar concerns apply when generalizing findings to other online P2P platforms. In 
my context, providers could switch relatively easily. Caution should be exercised to 
ensure online P2P platforms conform to the boundary conditions that the markets 
represent relatively low switching costs between implementing or forgoing screening. 
For platforms with high cost of switching or lack of autonomy to switch for 
participants, the cost-benefit calculus of participants may be more complicated and thus 
further studies may be needed to verify the applicability of my findings.  
Second, while I focused on heterogeneity in listing and host characteristics, my 
study abstracted away from demand heterogeneity, and potential market segmentation 
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with sub-pools of buyers and suppliers who equilibrate around choices of implementing 
or forgoing screening. Data constraints preclude the examination of whether different 
screening choices represent shifting compositions in guests, such that different guests 
find non-screening desirable. Particularly worthy of attention is whether instant 
booking enables greater substitution of Airbnb to traditional hotels where guests are 
not constrained by provider screening when making their choices. Future studies could 
compile data on buyers on Airbnb to append to the data on providers, and examine how 
differences in composition or potential increases in demand relate to provider choices 
of implementing or forgoing screening.  Such data would also enable future research 
to shed light on the impact of one party forgoing screening from the other party’s 
perspective, or the impact on market efficiencies in implementing options for forgoing 
screening for one or both sides of the market. Here, studies may be able to examine 
how buyers, and other providers, strategically respond to the focal provider’s choice of 
screening. For example, while I took a focal provider (listing)’s perspective on the 
option of forgoing screening, it is possible that the guests on Airbnb will have 
strategically changed their behavior too. Prior research suggests participants’ game 
with mechanisms in online markets (e.g., Klein et al. 2009; Ye et al. 2014), and hosts’ 
forgoing screening may induce the guests to behave more opportunistically.  
Third, one potential reason for Airbnb’s introduction of the forgoing screening 
mechanism is to combat observed accounts of racial discrimination.17 While forgoing 
screening clearly precludes hosts from engaging in racial discrimination, my study 
found evidence that race/ethnicity, more so than gender, matters in both whether hosts 




choose to implement or forgo screening, and the associated outcomes of their choices. 
The lack of granular data on interactions between hosts and guests precludes me from 
examining the mechanisms causing these choices and outcomes, and a deeper 
investigation into these issues represent important future research avenues.  For 
example, it is not clear whether the results that African American hosts are more likely 
to forgo screening is because they are less risk-averse as compared to Whites (e.g., 
Gutter and Hatcher 2008; Halek and Eisenhauer 2001), or whether, as I assume, they 
are responding to underlying heterogeneity in their individual demand, holding 
constant risk preferences.  Similarly, differential outcomes associated with choices 
when exercised by hosts of different race/ethnicities may be reflective of statistical or 
taste-based discrimination, and my study was unable to discern which factor 
dominated. As an example, it is unclear whether the lower declines in review ratings 
for African American hosts could also be driven by the guests’ higher ex ante 
expectations for Whites than for African Americans (Doleac and Stein 2013), causing 
higher possibility of ex post disconfirmation from unscreened guests and thus greater 
damage in review ratings for White hosts. Future studies could utilize laboratory or 
field experimental design to isolate and identify if other underlying mechanisms are at 
play for the results I uncover. Such studies would be critical for a deeper understanding 
of how market design on online platforms impact social welfare. For example, currently 
Airbnb automatically prioritizes instantly bookable listings in the search results. Could 
this lead to a disadvantage for White hosts who gain less from forgoing screening? 
Such questions highlight the importance of performing a comprehensive evaluation of 
any market mechanism by examining its direct and extended impacts for participants 
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of different races/ethnicities and genders. A careful identification of tradeoffs is needed 
to ensure overall benefits outweigh potential side effects and costs, as they relate not 
only to economic, but also social consequences in the form of discrimination based on 
race/ethnicity or gender. 
Fourth, while I have examined what listings are more likely to forgo screening 
and excluded several alternative explanations of why a listing may forgo screening, 
more studies leveraging causal designs can help clearly identify the mechanisms that 
drive a listing’s decision. Finally, while I have used different matching methods in the 
DiD estimation to account for the endogeneity issue of a listing’s forgoing screening 
status in a quasi-experimental setting, it is plausible that the self-selected status of a 
listing is influenced by other unobservable factors. Future research could leverage 
exogenous shocks on the Airbnb platform to further examine a listing’s decision of 







Chapter 3: Delaying Informed Consent: An Empirical Investigation of Mobile 
Apps’ Upgrade Decisions 
3.1     Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed a marked rise in consumer sensitivity to online 
information collection and privacy. About 86% of internet users have taken steps to 
avoid surveillance by organizations during their online browsing sessions (Rainie et al. 
2013). Recent cases of massive breach in privacy such as the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018) have only amplified such user 
concerns. With the rapid proliferation of mobile devices, privacy concerns have 
naturally extended to mobile devices (Barkhuus and Dey 2003). Smartphone mobile 
apps have traditionally obtained blanket permissions from users to access their sensitive 
information upon downloading these apps. IT security researchers have shown that 
over a third of the apps over-seek permissions (i.e., seek more permissions than strictly 
required for their functionality), which increases the risk of data misuse (Felt et al. 
2011). Users have increasingly become sensitive to such practices and have been 
proactively taking measures to protect their privacy, including abandoning apps or 
abandoning the platform altogether (Pingitore et al. 2017).  
In an attempt to respond to these concerns and provide users with better control 
over their mobile footprint, mobile platforms such as Android have released upgrades 
that provide users with fine-grained control over their information. In this study, I 
examine one such upgrade – the release of Android’s version 6.0 in late 2015. In earlier 
versions of Android, upon downloading the app, users automatically agreed to provide 
access to all sensitive information listed upfront by the app (such as contacts, phone 
memory, GPS). Android 6.0 allowed users to download apps without granting access 
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to any sensitive information and then required the apps to seek individual permissions 
to access users’ sensitive information (viz. dangerous permissions18, hereinafter simply 
referred to as permissions19 for the sake of brevity) when users opened the app. Such a 
change in Android’s privacy policy (illustrated in Figure 3.1) provides users with a 
choice to use the “watered-down”20 version of the app by granting permissions to 
sensitive information “as they desire”. 
While such changes to security and privacy policies are not new among platforms, 
Android’s decision to provide a time-window for apps to adhere to the new policy, 
makes this policy change unique and worth investigating. Before Android, Apple had 
introduced a fine-grained permission structure for sensitive information in iOS in 2012 
while Microsoft had introduced User Access Control in Windows Vista OS in 2007 
where programs required explicit permissions from users to access OS kernel. In both 
these instances, platforms used their market power to force all apps to upgrade and 
adhere to such policy changes to be eligible to run in their latest version. In contrast, 
Android gave mobile apps a window of three years (anytime between 2015 and 2018) 
to upgrade, instead of requiring them to upgrade immediately to the latest version21. 
While iOS and Windows required all apps to target the respective latest versions to be 
                                                 
18 As per Android’s website, “Dangerous permissions cover areas where the app wants data or 
resources that involve the user's private information, or could potentially affect the user's stored data or 
the operation of other apps” 
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview.html#normal-dangerous 
19 Apps are only required to explicitly seek dangerous permissions while they do not have to seek 
normal permission (e.g., phone vibration, prevent screen lock, turn on camera flash etc.). 
20 Users are not required to grant all permissions just to download the app. Instead, users can grant 
partial or no permissions but still download and run the app, to the extent that such permissions are not 
needed for its functioning. 
21 At the outset, we differentiate upgrades by users and apps. Users’ platform upgrade means that they 
install the latest version of Android on their mobile device. App’s platform upgrade means that apps 
compile using the latest version of the Software Development Kits (SDKs) provided by the platform 
and choose the latest version of the platform they want to target (called targetAPI in Android). 
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eligible to run on upgraded devices, Android allowed non-upgraded apps (i.e., targeting 
a lower Android version) to run on the latest Android phones. 
Android apps’ choice of when to upgrade to 6.0 (anytime between 2015 and 2018) 
meant that only those apps that upgraded to the latest version were required to adhere 
to the new privacy policies. Apps that delayed upgrading, however, could continue to 
seek permissions at download (instead of at run-time) even when such apps ran on 
phones that were upgraded to the latest version. Such apps could also release feature 
updates or fix bugs using older software development kits (SDKs). In other words, apps 
that delay upgrade would be “fully functional”. However, the apps that stayed with the 
older version of Android would forgo access to the latest platform features, 
optimizations, and support. 
Given the tradeoff between upgrading early to benefit from the platform’s latest 
features and staying with the older version to retain blanket access to user information, 
my study examines the choices made by different types of apps and their consequent 
outcomes. I first perform an exploratory analysis to understand the driving factors that 
prompt apps to delay upgrade. Next, I perform casual analysis to identify the effects of 
delaying upgrade on apps’ marketplace outcomes, i.e., their popularity (that dictates 
their visibility on the marketplace) and the user rating. Specifically, the three broad 
research questions that this project addresses are: (i) What are the characteristics of 
apps that delay upgrading to seeking run-time permissions? (ii) Does the 
(non)essentiality of the certain permissions to app’s working impact app’s decision to 
delay upgrade?, and (iii) How does strategically delaying upgrading affect apps’ 
marketplace outcomes (app rating and app popularity)?. 
49 
 
I assemble a unique panel of apps between April 2016 and March 2018 by installing 
13,604 most popular free Android apps on emulators and updating these apps on a 
monthly basis. I specifically develop an android app that scans the android app database 
of the host emulator and determines the Android version that each app targeted, along 
with a list of permissions sought by the apps. Next, I collect monthly snapshot of app 
characteristics, such as download buckets, ratings, total comments, categories, file-size 
(in MB), screenshots, app description, revenue model and developers’ information of 
over 2 million Android apps.  
To examine which apps over-seek permissions to users’ sensitive information, I 
categorize permissions into two groups: permissions that are required for apps’ 
operations (essential permissions) and those that are not (non-essential permissions). I 
employ Skip-gram Word2Vec and k-means clustering to divide apps from each 
Android app category into sub-categories based on their functional similarity and then 
statistically determine if each permission sought by apps is essential or not. Further, I 
employ weighted PageRank algorithm to derive a measure of apps’ popularity. For 
generating the PageRank, I use apps’ “similar apps” list on Play Store. 
To preview my findings, I employ Cox Proportional Hazard models and find apps 
that over seek permissions are more likely to delay upgrading to Android 6.0. Further, 
in investigating how the essentiality of each of the permissions for each app affects 
their propensity to delay upgrade, I find that the likelihood of delaying upgrade 
increases only for apps that seek more contextually non-essential permissions, while 
seeking essential permissions does not increase the propensity to delay upgrades. In 
examining further to understand what kinds of apps are more likely to display over-
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seeking behavior, I find that apps with in-app advertising as a revenue model are more 
likely to over seek non-essential permissions. Here I complement econometric methods 
with modern machine learning techniques to ascertain the apps’ over-seeking behavior. 
In essence, I find that apps that benefit from the use of sensitive information for in-app 
advertising revenues are more likely to continue over-seeking non-essential 
permissions and delay upgrading to Android 6.0. To address the concern that app’s 
decision to delay its upgrade could be operational, rather than strategic, I (a) employ 
models with developer fixed effects, (b) conduct a falsification test, (c) employ 
alternative (i.e., logit) model specifications and (d) forward evidences to rule out 
demand side reasons, supply side cost-reasons or lack of benefits reasons to delay 
upgrade. 
By employing popular matching techniques such as Dynamic Propensity Score 
Matching along with Difference-in-Differences technique, I find that apps that delay 
upgrading to the latest version significantly reduce seeking non-essential permissions 
by 6.79%, a larger magnitude reduction in seeking non-essential permissions than on-
time upgraders among apps. I also find that delaying upgrades effectively erases 
potential gains in ratings that apps would have received after upgrading, an equivalent 
of losing a rating boost from about 560 users. Furthermore, delaying upgrading to the 
latest Android version significantly reduces apps’ popularity measure by 9.06%, 
suggesting that strategic delays in upgrading to Android 6.0 results in both monetary 




This study makes a number of significant contributions. While extant research has 
investigated buyers’ perspective to changes in information privacy policies, to the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate sellers’ responses to exogenous 
changes in information gathering practices. Next, I add to the literature on temporal 
choices by showing that upgrading to the latest version at the earliest leads to beneficial 
outcomes for the apps in the marketplace, despite potentially disrupting its revenues in 
the short run. Next, my study guides platform mechanism designs by showing that 
providing a meaningful choice to app users to control their sensitive information 
improves apps’ information collection behavior. The findings suggest that reducing the 
cost of making privacy choices may help address the privacy paradox documented in 
privacy literature. By showing that even popular apps systematically lower seeking 
permissions, I highlight the role of platform mechanisms in safeguarding consumer 
interest. In doing so, I introduce the technique of utilizing advanced text analysis 
techniques to identify peer apps. Finally, my research adds to the literature on platform 
strategy by suggesting that a fragmented platform such as Android should carefully 
design the upgrade window to mitigate sub-optimal outcomes for the participants (apps, 
users) or the platform. 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
This research draws upon and contributes to three distinct streams of literature: users’ 
responses to privacy policies, user privacy preferences and strategic timing by firms. 
To place the contributions in perspective, I review the relevant literature, identify the 




3.2.1 Users’ responses to Privacy Policies 
Consumers’ responses (or lack thereof) to privacy concerns in an online market have 
been extensively studied in literature (see Bélanger and Crossler (2011) for a survey of 
privacy research in IS field). Consumers’ concerns about information privacy may stem 
from their limited control on how their personal information may be used by the online 
seller (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005b, Dinev and Hart 2006, Pavlou et al. 2007). Such 
concerns are quite valid, especially when the secondary usage of their private 
information may come at a cost to them in their future transactions (Varian 2009). 
Privacy concerns may also arise when consumers perceive sellers’ data gathering 
activity as excessive or irrelevant. Such perceptions impact consumer beliefs about 
trustworthiness of sellers and risks related to interactions with such sellers (in this case, 
apps) (Chellappa and Sin 2005, Malhotra et al. 2004, Pavlou et al. 2007).  
Under conditions that induce privacy concerns, users have responded by expressing 
preference to and/or taking actions to control of their sensitive information. One sub-
stream of literature has investigated consumers’ privacy concerns independent of 
sellers’ actions. Researchers have documented surveys and observations where 
significant proportion of consumers seek to gain control over information gathering 
and secondary usage of such information (Acquisti and Grossklags 2003, Hoffman et 
al. 1999, Phelps et al. 2000). Another sub-stream has investigated users’ reactions when 
sellers choose to adopt privacy practices. For instance, prior work (Aguirre et al. 2015, 
Culnan and Armstrong 1999, Dinev and Hart 2006, Hui et al. 2007) has shown that 
users’ risk perceptions and privacy concerns are significantly alleviated when websites 
guarantee fair information practices. Allowing consumers to opt-in for data collection 
also significantly increase their responses to personalized advertisements (Nowak and 
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Phelps 1995, Tucker 2014) or increase utilizing personalized services (Aguirre et al. 
2015, Chellappa and Sin 2005, Nowak and Phelps 1995, Tucker 2014).  
While there is a substantial body of research on users’ responses to privacy changes, 
hardly any studies have examined sellers’ responses to changes in privacy policies 
when such policies are exogenously imposed upon them. Literature has documented 
sellers’ response to changes in the nature of competition in the market (Chen and 
Forman 2006, Foerderer et al. 2018), however these responses are voluntary. Recent 
studies have investigated firms’ responses to adhering to the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) compliance (Garber 2018, Gradwohl 2018) but none has studied 
sellers’ responses in the context of online or mobile platforms. This research contribute 
to this stream of literature by examining apps’ responses when the Android platform 
enforces a new privacy policy. I document robust evidence that apps with questionable 
data collection behavior exhibit a tendency to strategically delay an upgrade that limits 
such behavior.  
3.2.2 Users’ Privacy Preferences 
Despite an increase in users’ concerns about their privacy, studies have consistently 
documented a paradox when such consumers internalize privacy choices. Researchers 
(Acquisti and Grossklags 2003, 2005b, Hann et al. 2007, Spiekermann et al. 2001) have 
observed that users that express concerns about privacy do not act to address such 
concerns when they have a choice. Some of the common inactions include not reading 
the privacy policies, not going through privacy settings, or not understanding the 
implications of Android permissions (Hoofnagle et al. 2010, Jensen and Potts 2004, 
Kelley et al. 2012). Furthermore, studies have found that buyers that express desire to 
protect their privacy are willing to exchange/disclose sensitive information for short 
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term benefits (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005a, Hui et al. 2007). Also, despite stating 
their desire to pay a premium for privacy (Tsai et al 2011), buyers have demonstrated 
a lack of willingness to incur a cost for privacy when such an option is made available 
to them (Brunk 2002, Rose 2005). Such inconsistencies in internalizing privacy choices 
by users may be explained by the difficulty in gauging the trade-off between the cost 
incurred from disclosing their sensitive information versus the benefits derived from 
disclosing sensitive information (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005b).  
Despite a large volume of existing literature on users’ privacy behavior, not many 
studies have examined the changes in users’ privacy behaviors when the cost of making 
the above described tradeoff is reduced. This research add to this literature stream in 
two ways. I show that reducing users’ cost of making privacy choices helps improve 
sellers’ information gathering practices on platforms. I show that shifting to (run-time) 
à la carte permission seeking reduces users’ cost of making privacy choices by 
allowing users to evaluate the relevance of each permission before granting them. I also 
find that apps reduce seeking permissions to access sensitive information after the 
Android update. 
3.2.3 Early vs. Late Movers 
My study is also related to a vast body of research examining firms’ timing of entry 
into new markets. Researchers (Barnett et al. 2012, Kalyanaram and Urban 1992, Kerin 
et al. 1992, Mitchell 1991) have studied early mover advantages for firms and have 
shown that early movers benefit from sustained market-share advantages. Other 
researchers (Agarwal and Gort 2001, Carow et al. 2004, Lieberman and Montgomery 
1988) have found that under certain conditions such as low imitation costs (absence of 
resource asymmetries, weak IP regime etc.), high market uncertainty (lack of industry 
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standard, large technological discontinuities etc.) or rapid interfirm diffusion of 
technology (high labor mobility, improvement in communication etc.), late movers 
might benefit more.  Most of these studies examine firms’ timing of entry in a market 
setting. In contrast, my study focuses on the timing of policy adoption, rather than 
market entry.  While market entry decisions are often made to maximize profits and/or 
gain market share, decisions regarding the timing of policy adoption are often made to 
minimize potential losses due to policy enactments. Hardly any studies have examined 
firms’ temporal choices under a policy enactment setup. Recent studies that examine 
firms’ responses to governmental policies such as GDPR have shown that well-
informed market players may be able to utilize the timing of movement as a signal of 
trustworthiness and a differentiator (Garber 2018, Gradwohl 2018). I am unaware of 
similar studies on an online platform setting. In essence, literature on early 
movers/adopters of change points towards a lack of rigorous investigations studying 
the timing of policy adherence on medium- to long-term revenue and reputational 
implications on the platform. I contribute to this literature by investigating the timing 
of policy adoption decisions by apps in a mobile platform, and their impacts on 
outcomes. 
3.2.4 Research Questions  
I find several gaps in literature that reference understanding the antecedents and 
consequences of delaying privacy policy adoption on platforms. First, there is a dearth 
of research studying factors that drive some of the apps’ upgrade decisions. Hence, my 
first research question (RQ1) asks and answers, “What are the characteristics of apps 
that delay upgrading to seeking run-time permissions?” I premise this question using 
the insights from literature on responses to privacy features. The shift from blanket 
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permissions at download-time to à la carte permissions at run-time focuses users’ 
attention on individual permissions sought by apps. Such enhanced attention on 
permissions may drive apps that seek a lot of permissions to strategically delay 
upgrading to the latest version.  
In my second research question (RQ2), I further test my conjecture about the 
strategic behavior of apps by distinguishing whether each of the permissions sought by 
apps are contextually essential (for app’s working) or not. As an illustration, in the 
context of a ride-hailing app (such as Lyft/Uber), accessing GPS is contextually 
essential but accessing phone’s microphone may be contextually irrelevant. 
Specifically, I ask and answer, “Do strategic reasons (such as monetization from 
continued access to non-essential (to app’s core functionality) sensitive information) 
drive app’s decision to delay upgrading to seeking run-time permissions?”. I premise 
this question by referring to the information security literature that has documented 
permission over-seeking behavior. While upgrading to the latest version of Android 
provides apps with access to the platform’s latest features and improvements, it also 
restricts free access to users’ sensitive information that apps enjoyed prior to upgrade. 
It makes sense then, that upgrading to the latest version has different associated costs 
and benefits for apps with different revenue models. Based on this cost-benefit calculus 
logic, I conjecture that apps that benefit from over-seeking non-essential permissions 
from users would strategically delay this upgrade. 
The third research question (RQ3) seeks to causally identify the outcomes 
associated with delaying upgrade. Specifically, I ask and answer, “How does delaying 
upgrading affect apps’ marketplace outcomes (app rating and app popularity)”. Here, 
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I focus on the effect of timing of mobile apps’ decision to upgrade to Android 6.0. From 
the literature survey, it is unclear whether being an early-mover in a policy adoption 
scenario is advantageous at all. Understanding if there are repercussions to strategically 
delaying upgrading, has important policy implications for an open platform such as 
Android. The next section describes my research context and data to address the above-
mentioned questions. 
3.3 Research Context and Data 
I examine my research questions on the app marketplace (called Play Store) of Android, 
the world’s largest smartphone platform (Statista 2018a). Despite Android launching 
version 6.0 in late 2015, my panel starts from April 2016 when the user installation 
base for Android 6.0 reached 5% (Android 2016, Statista 2018b). The choice of time-
line addresses the potential lack of motivation among apps in the initial months when 
there aren’t many Android users who have upgraded to Android 6.022. I compile my 
data by combining two data sources that I gather over two years. 
First, I take a list of 21,000 23 most downloaded free/freemium apps as of April 
2016 and install these apps (over 1 terabyte) on emulators on research PCs at my lab. 
Installing apps is the only clean way to extract the Android version number of that app 
(targetAPI) since only an installed file carries the signature (SDK version) with the 
targetAPI. I chose free apps instead of paid apps because paid apps tend to be less 
strategic in terms of permissions, due to lower reliance on user’s information for 
                                                 
22 Initial 5% of users have been shown to exhibit willingness to take risks with new features and provide 
valuable feedback to products for further improvement (Mahajan and Muller 1998), thereby helping app 
evolution. 
23 The list contains all apps that had greater than 500,000 downloads (Around 18,600 apps) and about 
2400 apps with 100,000-500,000 or lower downloads. 
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revenues. I developed and installed a custom-built Android app that scans installed 
apps and extracts the targetAPI of each installed app, app version number, and the list 
of all permissions sought by those apps. I updated all installed apps monthly to collect 
the data points mentioned above for 24 months. 
My second data source is the Android’s Play Store website from which I 
exhaustively collect details of over two million Android apps on a monthly basis. I 
collect information such as app description, rating, download count bucket, count of 
reviews, categories, date of last update, number of screenshots uploaded, app’s file size 
(in MB), developer ID of all apps and two dummy variables, one each to indicate 
whether the app has in-app advertising or in-app purchase options in for each month. 
Merging this dataset with the earlier dataset gives me an unbalanced panel of 13,604 24 
apps for 24 months (April 2016 to March 2018), resulting in 278,955 app-month 
observations25. 
3.3.1 Essential and Non-essential Permissions 
A key task in my investigation is to determine which of the permissions sought are 
essential for the app’s working. To achieve this, I divide apps into sub-categories 
(called peer groups) of similar functionality based Peer Group Analysis Technique 
(Pelikan et al. 2017). I then use a statistical technique similar to Permission Prevalence 
Analysis (Taylor and Martinovic 2016) to determine which permissions are non-
essential for app’s working. First, I employ Skip-gram Word2Vec, a modern and highly 
                                                 
24 Of the list, 6648 apps were not available to download on emulators in the United States. Another 748 
apps got pulled out of the Play Store with less than 12 months in my panel resulting in 13,604 unique 
apps in my panel. 
25 While we should have 326,496 observations (13,604*24) in my dataset, some of the apps are not 
available in Play Store for all 24 months, mostly because they are pulled out of US Play Store. 
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effective text-mining technique, to obtain vector representation for each app. A 
distributed vector representation of words, that learns the locational similarity and 
context of words in a statement, has been proven more accurate than the traditional bag 
of words or n-gram vectors (Mnih and Hinton 2009). For my analysis, this technique 
is preferred over Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), because of 
Word2Vec’s ability to capture synonyms, contexts of words or grammatical nuances 
such as plurals (Ramos 2003). Furthermore, TF-IDF may suffer from curse of 
dimensionality when the corpus is large (Hinneburg and Keim 1999). Word2Vec by 
Mikolov et al. (2013) resolves these issues by using Skip-gram model to create a 300-
dimensional distributed vector representation for each word. I get a single 300-
dimensional vector for a document by combining individual word vectors of that 
document. Since app descriptions are written in standard English with carefully curated 
English words/phrases, I utilize a model trained on 100 billion words from a Google 
news dataset to improve the accuracy of dividing apps into peer-groups based on 
functional similarity. 
I start with tagging each app description from Play Store with a category label 
determined by Android (see Appendix Table A6 for a comprehensive list of categories). 
Since these categories are pre-determined by Android, I am assured of the general 
similarity between apps under the same category. Next, I use an unsupervised learning 
technique to divide apps within each category into sub-categories of apps that have 
similar functionality and utility. 
Codifying the process to determine the sub-category of apps, I: 
I. Obtain a 300-dimensional vector for each app based on app description by 
employing Word2Vec.  
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II. employ k-means clustering to determine the optimal sub-categories within each 
category  
a. Determine the range of optimal clusters [km-kn] for app category c using Elbow 
technique, AIC, BIC 
b. Determine the least number of clusters (kc), within [km-kn], wherein each cluster 
has at least 5 apps. 
c. Divide apps under each category c into kc clusters (i.e., kc sub-categories of each 
of c category) 
To illustrate the effectiveness of sub-categorization, I chart a word-cloud for the sub-
categories created under two of the most generic categories, “Productivity” and 
“Lifestyle”. As seen in Figure 3.2, the sub-categories are quite homogenous while 
distinct from each other. I also manually verify a random sub-set of all algorithmically 
generated sub-categories to ensure that the sub-categorization has worked well.  
Next, similar to the statistical technique proposed by Sarma et al. (2012) or Taylor 
and Martinovic (2016), I determine which of the permissions sought are essential to all 
apps in each sub-category/peer-group. I code those permissions requested by more than 
75% of the apps in a sub-category/peer group as essential permissions and the rest as 
non-essential permissions. To build intuition, I consider navigation apps: permission 
to access GPS is essential for any navigation app; hence, at least 75% of such apps 
would seek permissions to GPS. On the contrary, access to users’ call log does not seem 
essential to navigation apps; hence, I would expect less than 75% of the apps to seek 
permission to access the call log. I found qualitatively similar results by varying the 
threshold between 60% and 90%. 
3.3.2  Popularity of Apps 
Play Store does not publicly disclose the exact download count for each app. This 
precludes researchers from using download counts to estimate an app’s popularity. 
Hence, I determine app popularity by building a network of apps and estimating each 
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app’s network centrality. For this, I employ Weighted PageRank algorithm (Page et al 
1999) to derive app popularity score. Researchers (Oestreicher-Singer and 
Sundararajan 2012; Kane and Ransbotham 2016) have employed variants of PageRank 
algorithm to derive the importance of various nodes in a network using the concept of 
eigenvector centrality. Intuitively, an influential node has a larger eigenvector 
centrality. Alternatively, a larger value of eigenvector centrality for a node also means 
that the node is pointed to by (i.e., receives a vote of support from) many nodes. I 
employ the latter interpretation of eigenvector centrality in my investigation. For each 
app in the Play Store, Android provides a list of  “similar” apps (see Figure 3.3).  
The similar apps list can be thought of as a “vote of support” from the focal app to 
the similar apps. Intuitively, the greater the popularity of an app, the greater the 
likelihood that such an app would appear on similar apps’ list of many apps in a given 
category. Therefore, by gathering similar apps’ lists for each of the apps, I can estimate 
how popular the app is. I employ a modified variant of PageRank algorithm, where I 
use an app’s position in the similar apps list to determine the strength of the vote of 
support. Specifically, I use the formula max(1-rank/24, 0.25) to determine the strength 
of the directed edge from the focal app to similar apps. I repeat this process for each 
month to estimate app’s popularity in any given month. 
3.3.3 Variable Definitions 
Table 3.1 provides a detailed description of the variables used in the major analyses. 
Appendix Tables A7 and A8 provide the summary statistics and correlation matrix of 
the variables. 
Variables of Interest: Our first three variables of interest are defined as the count of 
total permissions sought, essential permissions sought, and non-essential permissions 
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sought, respectively. We normalize the three variables by computing the ratio of 
permissions sought to all permissions utilized by the app (dangerous and normal26) and 
use the three ratios as independent variables in survival models.27 Variable upgradeit is 
coded as 1 once the given app performs an upgrade to the latest version and 0 before 
that. Upon upgrading from version 5.1 (or below) to 6.0 (or above), the value changes 
to and stays at 1. Finally, ratingit captures the user rating that the app i has received by 
the end of month t. Finally, we derive popularityit using the weighted PageRank 
algorithm as outlined in Section 3.2. 
Explanatory Variables: The explanatory variables are app characteristics that represent 
app demand, apps’ appearance on the Play Store and developers’ details from Play 
Store. For each app on a given month, I capture the total count of ratings provided by 
users, number of days elapsed since the developer has pushed an update (features, bug 
fixes or upgrades), total count of apps by focal app’s developer on Play Store, count of 
screenshots that the app has on app’s Play Store, file-size and revenue model (in-app-
purchases or in-app-advertising). 
Control Variables: I use a set of control variables to account for unobserved app 
characteristics. I classify the app categories into six groups based on prior research (for 
example, (Ghose and Han 2014)) and how categories evolve over time. The six 
categories include: Online Content Consumption (Media and Entertainment), Learn 
and Explore, Personal (Social and Lifestyle), Mobile Specific Utilities (services that 
                                                 
26 Normal Permissions cover areas which pose very little risk to user’s privacy (e.g., setting alarm, 
accessing Wi-Fi state). Consumers don’t have a choice to rejecting them since developers are not 
required to explicitly seek permissions from users. 
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview.html#normal-dangerous 




are enabled by a cellphone technology such as GPS), Mobile Access Utilities (mobile 
apps provided by offline or internet utility firms), and Games. Finally, 
download_bucketit captures the range of app downloads that Play Store publishes
28.  
3.4. Analyses and Results 
3.4.1  What are the characteristics of apps that delay upgrading?  
To investigate how an app’s characteristics and its permission-seeking behavior affects 
the app’s decision to delay upgrade to the latest version, I employ a continuous-time 
single-failure survival model. Specifically, I employ a Cox Proportional-Hazard model 
that investigates how various covariates of interest affect upgrading to the latest version 
of Android. In my analysis, I consider upgrading to Android 6.0, represented by a 
dichotomous variable, as failure. The survival model is specified as below: 
λi(t) = λ0(t) exp(c1* sought_permissions_ ratioi + c2*Δrating_counti +  c3* 
ratingi + c4* dayssinceupdatei + c5*screenshotsi + c6* filesizei + 
c7*developer_appcounti  + Γ*download_bucketi + Λ*category_groupi ) 
(3.1) 
where the subscript i indexes apps and subscript t indexes months, λi(t) is the hazard 
of the app i upgrading to Android 6.0 at time t while λ0(t) represents the baseline hazard 
of upgrading to Android 6.0. Single-failure specification discards the observations after 
failure has occurred. For each of the covariates, a hazard rate less than 1 (HR<1) 
indicates that the co-variate decelerates the chances of failure (in this case, upgrading 
to Android 6.0), i.e., increases the chances of delaying upgrade and vice versa with 
HR>1. Such an interpretation is consistent with literature (for example, (Kauffman et 
al. 2000)). In this model, I pool essential and non-essential permissions in order to 
                                                 
28 The download buckets: 1-5 downloads, 5-10, 10-50, 50-100, 100-500, 500-1k, 1k-5k, 5k-10k, 10k-
50k, 50k-100k, 100k-500k, 500k-1M, 1M-5M, 5M-10M, 10M-50M, 50M-100M, 100M-500M, 500M-
1B and 1B-5B downloads 
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focus on the effects of app characteristics and apps’ marketplace standings on delaying 
upgrade. I explore the heterogeneous effects on later models. Outcomes of model (3.1) 
are presented in Table 3.2.  
Column 1 provides the point estimates while column 2 provides the corresponding 
Hazard Ratio (HR). The hazard rate of ratingit is significant and greater than 1, 
indicating that apps with higher ratings are less likely to delay upgrade. Apps that have 
higher monthly review counts, an indicator of app’s efforts to solicit ratings and 
feedback, have a lower propensity to delay upgrade. The number of days since the latest 
update, an indicator of app’s maintenance cycle, increases the propensity to delay 
upgrade. App file-size, an indicator of the sophisticated nature of the app and number 
of screenshots uploaded to the Play Store, an indicator of app demand (Ghose and Han 
2014), negatively impact the propensity to delay upgrade. Finally, I find that apps that 
have less than 1-million downloads are significantly more likely to delay upgrade to 
the newer Android version while apps with more than 10 million downloads are less 
likely to delay upgrade to the latest version. 
Shifting the focus to app characteristics, I find that, compared to the “online content 
consumption” apps (such as video streaming services), mobile-specific utility apps 
(such as the messaging, navigation, food delivery apps) and game apps are more likely 
to delay upgrade to the new version of Android. Similarly, personal apps (such as social 
networking/dating apps) are more likely (p<0.10) to delay upgrade. This is consistent 
with reports that have found that apps from the above-mentioned categories are more 
likely to over-seek non-essential permissions (Maheshwari 2017, Stamm 2018).  
65 
 
I now focus on effects of permission-seeking behavior on upgrade decisions. I find 
that an app’s likelihood of delaying upgrade to the latest Android version increases 
with an increase in the ratio of permissions sought by the apps. This indicates that apps 
that seek more permissions prefer to retain control over access to users’ private 
information for as long as they can.  
To further investigate how seeking individual permissions affect developers’ 
propensity to delay upgrade, I alter the Cox PH model in (3.1) to the following:  
λi(t) = λ0(t) exp(C * permissions_vectori + c2*Δrating_counti +  c3* ratingi + 
c4* dayssinceupdatei + c5*screenshotsi + c6* filesizei + 
c7*developer_appcounti  + Γ*download_bucketi + Λ*category_groupi ) 
(3.2) 
where the subscript i indexes apps and t indexes months. Here, permissions_vectorit   
is a vector of dummies, indicating the presence of individual permissions and C is a 
vector of coefficients for this vector of dummies. Table 3.3 carries the results of the 
estimation of model (3.2). As seen in Table 3.3, only specific permissions that users 
may consider as sneaky or running in the background, such as permissions to access 
users’ information (call logs, phone memory, accessing user’s ID or user’s phone 
status) or their phone hardware (microphone or fine GPS location) increase the 
propensity to delay upgrade to Android 6.0 (i.e., HR<1 and significant).  
In summary, the analysis indicates that seeking more permissions, increases the 
propensity to delay upgrade. In the next section, I perform multitudes of tests including 
a falsification test and forward arguments to rule out alternative explanations.  
3.4.1.1 Ruling out Alternative Explanations 
An app’s decision to delay upgrade may be due to the cost related to upgrading, the 
lack of demand for an upgrade from the existing users, the lack of benefit from 
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upgrading or the app’s desire to retain control over users’ information. In this section, 
I rule out these alternative explanations.  
Developers incur a cost to upgrade because the process of upgrading to a latest 
version requires them to understand changes in the SDK (such as new features) and 
modify app control flow (if needed) based on best practices recommended by the latest 
SDK. Such cost incurred may heterogeneously affect developers depending on their 
size/capacity. I account for such heterogeneity in my models by controlling for 
developers’ monthly app count (indicator of their size) on Play Store. Second, by 
focusing my analyses on the most-downloaded apps, I further mitigate cost-side 
concerns. This is because I expect developers of popular apps to have the motivation 
and monetary incentives to keep their apps updated and relevant. Next, I account for 
apps’ sophisticated nature and maintenance cycle by including the app characteristics 
such as its file size, popularity (i.e., count of reviews left by app users) and maintenance 
cycle (dayssinceupdateit) in the models. Finally, in unreported results, I estimate the 
Cox Proportional Hazard model with developer fixed effects to investigate if the results 
hold. Using developer fixed effects discards observations of 5,073 apps where none of 
the apps by a developer upgrades to Android 6.0 during the duration of the panel. The 
results are consistent with the main analysis, further confirming that my results are not 
driven by developer heterogeneity. Another major reason why apps might delay 
upgrading may stem from user demand. Apps may have lesser incentive to upgrade if 
they cater to a majority of users that will not upgrade their phones to the latest Android 
version. While such a scenario (existing users not upgrading) is feasible, Android’s 
platform strategy provides good reasons why those apps should still upgrade. Android 
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maintains a “Quality Score” for listed apps in Play Store29 and explicitly states that the 
quality score, and therefore the app’s Play Store ranking, may be affected by delaying 
upgrade. A better Play Store rank aids in better discovery in the Play Store when new 
users search for a specific utility or when they scroll through the “similar apps” list. 
Furthermore, despite upgrading to the latest Android version, apps would still seek 
download-time permissions to user information from users that do not upgrade. Hence, 
platform’s design decisions help rule out demand-related reasons for delaying upgrade. 
Another explanation for why certain apps may have no incentives to upgrade is the 
lack of benefits (to apps and/or users) from upgrading to the latest android version. 
Simply put, only apps that find new Android features more beneficial are more likely 
to upgrade while others do not invest effort to upgrade. A survey of all changes 
incorporated in the 6.0 version of Android informs me that all new features and 
improvements would be beneficial to all apps equally. For example, Android made 
significant improvements to its notification services, which would equally improve the 
user notification effectivity for all apps. Furthermore, I also find that none of the 
changes made to existing features in Android (other than changes to permission 
seeking) adversely affects apps’ functionality. Hence, I am confident that there are no 
other feature improvement motivations that may impact apps’ strategies for delaying 
this upgrade. Thus, choosing not to upgrade based on lack of benefits from upgrading 
does not appear to be the driving reason. 
3.4.1.2 Falsification Test: Upgrading to an earlier version of Android 




In the earlier section, I argue that the ability to continue seeking (potentially 
unnecessary) permissions is the primary reason why apps delay upgrading to Android 
6.0 (targetAPI 23). A falsification test is to check whether such a finding holds/fails 
when apps upgrade to an earlier version (i.e., prior to targetAPI 23). If losing the ability 
to seek blanket permissions were indeed the primary reason for delaying upgrade to 
targetapi 23, then seeking more permissions should not increase the propensity to delay 
upgrading to earlier versions, such as Android 5 (or Android 5.1). To test this, I employ 
a Cox Proportional Hazard model similar to model (3.1) with a few changes. In this 
model, failure is determined by a dichotomous variable that carries the value 1 when 
and after the app upgrades to targetAPI 22 (Android 5.1) or above from a lower version. 
Consistent with the earlier approach, observations post-failure are discarded in the Cox 
Proportional Hazard model. Table 3.4 carries the results of the falsification test. 
In both columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4, the Hazard Ratio of 
sought_permissions_ratioit is significant and greater than 1. This differs my findings 
from Table 3.2, where I found the hazard ratio to be significant and less than 1. Upon 
carefully investigating new features that were introduced in targetAPI 21 or targetAPI 
22, I find that in Android 5.0 and 5.1, the Android platform revoked restrictions (which 
Android had enforced in an earlier version) that prevented apps from accessing files 
that did not belong to the app’s own home directory30. Android also introduced screen 
capture and sharing functions, as well as features to programmatically access users’ 
camera devices (new camera API), app usage history, and battery usage logs.  These 




features incentivized apps seeking more (non-essential) permissions to upgrade to 
targetAPI 21/22 but not targetAPI 23. 
3.4.2 Is the app’s decision to delay upgrading to seeking run-time permissions 
strategic? 
This research question builds on RQ1 by investigating whether apps’ decision to delay 
upgrade is linked to apps’ monetization from continued access to non-essential (to 
app’s core functionality) sensitive information. To address this research question, I 
replace the variable sought_permissions_ratioit in the model (1) with variables that 
measure the essential and non-essential permissions respectively. As outlined in 
section 3.1, I use Skip-gram Word2Vec and k-means clustering to sub-categorize 
Android apps into functionally similar groups and then statistically distinguish 
contextually essential permissions from non-essential permissions. 
λi(t) = λ0(t) exp(c1* essential_permissions_ratioi + c2*Δrating_counti +  c3* ratingi 
+ c4* dayssinceupdatei + c5*screenshotsi + c6* filesizei + c7*developer_appcounti  
+ Γ*download_bucketi + Λ*category_groupi ) 
(     (3.3) 
λi(t) = λ0(t) exp(c1* nonessential_permissions_ratioi + c2*Δrating_counti +  c3* 
ratingi + c4* dayssinceupdatei + c5*screenshotsi + c6* filesizei + 
c7*developer_appcounti  + Γ*download_bucketi + Λ*category_groupi ) 
(     (3.4) 
where the subscript i indexes apps and t indexes months. If both types of 
permissions types (i.e. essential and non-essential permissions) equally affect apps’ 
decision to delay upgrade, I expect to see similar Hazard Ratios for the coefficients in 
models (3.3) and (3.4) as in model (3.1) (i.e., HR<1 and significant for c1). A change 
in HR (from HR<1 to HR>1) or different statistical significance of one of these two 
coefficients would mean that there is a heterogeneous effect of essential and non-




The hazard ratio in column (1) for essential_ permissions_ratioit is significant and 
greater than 1 while the hazard ratio in column (2) for nonessential_ 
permissions_ratioit. is significant and less than 1. Taken together, these indicate that 
the propensity to delay upgrading to the latest version is influenced by only the non-
essential permissions sought by apps. This finding is consistent with my earlier 
argument that apps that over-seek non-essential permissions are more likely to delay 
upgrade.  
3.4.2.1 What drives apps to over-seek non-essential Permissions?  
My investigation so far suggests that apps that overseek non-essential permissions 
delay upgrading to Android 6.0. A natural question that arises from my investigation 
is, why do some apps seek non-essential permissions, which in-turn increases their 
propensity to delay upgrading? The results in Table 3.3 shows that permissions to 
access users’ personal information such as call logs, phone memory, user ID or phone 
status or permissions to access their hardware such as microphone or GPS increases 
the propensity of apps to delay upgrade. Apart from the sneakiness of these 
permissions, reports have shown that users’ sensitive information, such as GPS 
location, microphone recordings or personal connections, have been abused by apps 
for personalized ad-targeting (Goode 2018, Limer 2018). It stands to reason then, that 
apps that rely on users’ sensitive information to generate revenue are more likely to 
over-seek non-essential permissions. Such over-seeking behavior should in-turn drive 
these apps to strategically delay upgrade so that they continue collecting sensitive 
information for as long they can. In unreported analysis, I utilized machine-learning 
techniques to further support my intuition that the decision to delay upgrade are driven 
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by apps’ ad-targeting behavior. Specifically, I employ a combination of SkipGram 
based Topic Modeling and Lasso Logit to identify topics that predict delaying upgrade. 
I find high similarities (cosine similarity) between these topics and media report 
clippings that report on aggressive advertising or “adware” in Android. 
I now investigate whether the app’s revenue model impacts its likelihood of 
delaying upgrading to Android 6.0. Of the two main freemium revenue models in Play 
Store, in-app-advertising (IAA) and in-app-purchases (IAP), I expect apps with an IAA 
revenue model to have stronger incentives to seek more permissions and delay upgrade. 
Alternatively, I expect apps with IAP revenue model not to impact the decision to delay 
upgrade. As expected, Appendix Table A9 shows that IAA revenue model positively 
impacts the link between permissions and decision to delay upgrade while IAP revenue 
model does not (neither directly nor indirectly) impact the decision to delay upgrade. 
To rigorously test the link between IAA revenue model and the propensity to delay 
upgrade, I follow a two-stage control function approach called the Two-Stage Residual 
Inclusion (2SRI) method (Terza et al. 2008, Wooldridge 2015). The procedure involves 
a two-stage model wherein the first stage estimates the effect of IAA revenue model on 
seeking permissions while the second stage estimates the effect of seeking permissions 
on the propensity to delay upgrade. Since the second stage is a survival model, 
following Terza et al. (2008), and Wooldridge (2015), I use the 2SRI approach instead 
of the traditional 2SLS approach. Such a procedure has been widely used across social 
science disciplines including Finance (Chen et al. 2013), Marketing (Risselada et al. 
2014), Sociology (Lyons et al. 2013) and Economics (Beaudry and Allaoui 2012). I 
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employ a generalized version of 2SRI model that uses individual frailty (Martínez-
Camblor et al. 2017, Martínez‐Camblor et al. 2019).  
The decision of utilizing IAA revenue model should affect apps’ decision to over-
seek non-essential permissions for sensitive information. However, unlike other 
revenue models, including display advertisements within apps neither increases the 
complexity of app nor requires extensive feature development. Therefore, displaying 
in-app-advertising should not operationally affect apps’ decision to delay upgrade, 
except through their decision to over-seek non-essential permissions. Hence, the 
excluded instrument from the first stage satisfies the exclusion restriction. The 
statistical tests (i.e., under-identification test and weak first stage test) suggest that the 
excluded instrument is statistically valid. Table 3.6 shows the outcome of this 
estimation.  
From column (2) of Panel (A) find that having in-app-advertising (IAA) as a 
revenue model has a strong and significant effect on seeking non-essential permissions, 
while IAA does not impact seeking essential permissions (see Column (1) of Panel A). 
the decision to delay upgrade, but only via its impact on non-essential permissions. The 
statistical tests (i.e., under-identification test and weak first stage test) suggest that the 
excluded instrument is statistically valid for non-essential permissions model.  
The second stage of both the models (Panel B of Table 3.6) show qualitatively 
consistent results as Table 3.5, ascertaining my claim that apps that overseek non-
essential permissions delay upgrading.  
To visualize the findings, I plot the essential and non-essential permissions sought 
by apps across the Android versions over three different period spread across the panel. 
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As seen in Figure 3.4, there is a significant drop in seeking non-essential permissions 
moving from targetAPI 22 to targetAPI 23, but insignificant changes in essential 
permissions, further adding strength to my arguments. 
3.4.3 Effect of timing of upgrading on the outcome for apps 
I seek to understand if Android’s privacy policy change is indeed effective in improving 
apps’ sensitive information-gathering behavior by investigating the policy’s effect on 
apps’ permission-seeking behavior. It is also useful to learn whether strategically 
delaying adhering to such policy changes are accompanied by marketplace penalties, 
as measured by the app ratings AND app’s popularity on Play Store. To address the 
questions on the impact of apps’ time choice of upgrading, I employ Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) to pre-process the data (Dehejia and Wahba 2002) and employ a 
Difference-in-Differences technique (DiD) to establish causality of the relationship 
between the treatment and the treated (Meyer 1995). 
3.4.3.1 Model Setup 
The timing of upgrading to the latest version is a choice that apps exercise; hence the 
process of upgrading is considered a treatment in my setup. A DiD approach enables 
me to compare and contrast the effects on apps that upgrade to the latest versions (the 
treated apps), with those apps that do not upgrade until the end of my panel (the control 
apps). Since the treated apps upgrade over a period of several months, i.e., in a 
staggered manner, I set the month of treatment (month when the treated app upgrades) 
to time 0 and adjust the months prior to and post that in reverse chronological order 
(…-3, -2, -1) and sequential order (1, 2, 3…) respectively. Such a normalization of time 
is performed based on prior research (Autor 2003, Fang et al. 2014, Gao and Zhang 
2016). Employing DiD estimation approach in a non-experimental setup such as mine 
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requires that I correct for treatment selection bias. To address this, I employ PSM as 
my pre-processing technique. PSM has been used in many non-experimental settings 
(Dehejia and Wahba 2002). Specifically, techniques combining PSM to pre-process the 
dataset followed by DiD have been used in research where the treatment may be 
affected by a selection bias (Liu and Lynch 2011, Smith and Todd 2005). If matched 
correctly, the treated and control samples will have the same propensity to upgrade to 
the latest version in a given month, with the decision to upgrade being the only 
difference. In other words, each treated app (an app that upgrades within the time-
period of the panel) is matched with a control app that never upgrades until the end of 
the panel. I apply nearest one-to-one neighbor matching without replacement of the 
control samples. To account for the difference in time periods when treatments are 
introduced (app A upgrades in June 2016, app B upgrades in July 2016), I follow a 
dynamic matching technique where I match the treated apps with control apps one 
month before the month of treatment.  
The covariates used for matching include app characteristics such as the app rating, 
count of rating, file size, screenshots uploaded, date since the latest update and revenue 
model dummies. Also, I explicitly ensure that treated and control apps come from the 
same download bucket and belong to the same app category. The matching procedure 
gives me 2628 treated and 2628 control mobile apps in the final sample. As the first 
test for successful matching procedure, I compare continuous covariates in my models 
before and after the matching procedure. The outcomes of covariate balance tests for 




Model (3.5) estimates whether, and by how much, upgrading to the latest version 
changes apps’ information gathering behavior, reflected by permissions they continue 
to seek. Model (3.6) estimates the impact of upgrade on their apps’ marketplace 
outcomes as seen from apps’ ratings. 
essential_permissionsit = α0a + α1a*Δrating_countit + α2a*ratingit + 
α3a*post_upgradet + α4a *upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet + α5a* 
dayssinceupdateit + α6a*filesizeit + α7a*screenshotsit + α8a* 
developer_appcountit + α9a*download_bucketi + α10a*month_dummyt +wi + εait  
(3.5a) 
 
nonessential_permissionsit = α0b + α1b*Δrating_countit + α2b*ratingit + 
α3b*post_upgradet + α4b*upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet + α5b* 
dayssinceupdateit + α6b*filesizeit + α7b*screenshotsit + α 8b* 
developer_appcountit + α9b*download_bucketi + α10b*month_dummyt +wi + εbit  
(3.5b) 
 
popularityit= β0a + β1a*Δrating_countit + β2a* sought_permissions_ratioit-1 + 
β3a* ratingit + β4a * post_upgradet + β5a*upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet + β6a* 
dayssinceupdateit + β7a*filesizeit + β8a* screenshotsit + β9a* 
developer_appcountit + β10a*download_bucketi + β11a*month_dummyt +wi + ηait  
(3.6a) 
log(ratingit)= β 0 + β1*Δrating_countit + β2* sought_permissions_ratioit-1 + β3* 
post_upgradet + β4*upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet + β 5* dayssinceupdateit + 
β6*filesizeit + β7* screenshotsit + β8* developer_appcountit + 
β9*download_bucketi + β10*month_dummyt +wi + ηit  
(3.6b) 
In the above models, upgrade_groupi is a binary variable that carries a value of 1 
for apps in the treated group and 0 for apps in the control group. For each treated-
control pair, the variable post_upgradet carries a value of 0 before the treated app 
performs an upgrade and 1 after it upgrades to the latest version. Since I follow the time 
normalization procedure described above, upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet identifies 
the effect of upgrading as this coefficient equals 1 only for treated apps 
(upgrade_groupi =1) post the upgrade (post_upgradet=1). Coefficients α4a, α4b and β4 
in the above models above provide me with required DiD estimates for the model. The 
variable wi represents the app-level fixed effects to account for any app level 
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unobserved heterogeneity. Logging the rating variable and scaling the variable by 100 
allows me to interpret the outcome as percentage change. While I separately estimate 
the outcomes on essential and non-essential permissions in the main analyses, I conduct 
robustness checks by pooling the permissions. 
Parallel trends assumption states that the control and treated apps should have a 
similar time trend before the treatment. To test this assumption, I follow the 
recommendations in literature (Autor 2003) where I estimate models similar to (3.5) 
and (3.6), but by modeling time trends of the dependent variables in the models. This 
can be done by introducing interaction terms of the treatment and the pre-treatment 
month dummies. The models are quite similar to equations (2.5) through (2.7) in the 
previous chapter. 
I list the outcome of these models in Appendix Table A10. All interaction terms 
before the month of upgrade are insignificant, therein assuring that the Parallel Trends 
Assumption is not violated by the matching technique. Figure 3.4 provides the pictorial 
representation of parallel trends assumption for essential and non-essential 
permissions. 
3.4.3.2 Determining if apps are delaying upgrading to Android 6.0 
Apps indulging in strategic delaying behavior is neither beneficial to the customers 
(they lose out on enhanced security, improved reliability, better UI and UX) nor to the 
platform (because it would exacerbate the existing issue of supporting multiple SDK 
versions). Hence, I investigate if strategic delaying has repercussions on apps’ 
outcomes. To study the effect of timing on apps’ information gathering behavior and 
marketplace outcomes, I distinguish early/on-time upgraders from late upgraders 
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among apps in my models. Since Android launches a new version every year, I consider 
all those apps that upgraded to Version 6.0 (or above) after users started to upgrade to 
Version 7.0 of Android as late upgraders among apps. While Android announced their 
new version (Version 7.0) at the end of August 2016, the Android 7.0 customer base 
crossed 0.1% of overall Android customer base only by November 2016. Hence, I 
consider all apps that upgraded from version 5.1 or below (download-time permissions) 
to 6.0 or a higher version (run-time permissions) in and after November 2016 as late 
upgraders. I alter models (3.4) and (3.5) to incorporate another two-way interaction 
term between the dummy late_upgrade_groupi that carries the value of 1 if the treated 
app upgrades after November 2016 and the dummy post_upgradet that indicates 
whether the current time-period is before or after the treatment in DiD models. 
3.4.3.3 How does delaying upgrading to seeking run-time permissions affect the 
outcome for apps? 
In this section, I investigate whether apps’ decision to upgrade are accompanied by 
their change in information gathering behavior as well as marketplace outcomes.  
3.4.3.3.1 Does delaying upgrading affect apps’ sensitive information gathering 
behavior? 
Model (3.4) estimates the effects of upgrading on app’s information seeking behavior, 
the outcomes of which have been presented in Panels A and B of Table 3.8. Columns 
(1) and (2) present the DiD estimation of upgrading while columns (3) and (4) present 
the estimation by including an interaction term between late_upgrade_groupi and 
post_upgradei. This interaction term identifies the effect of delaying the upgrade on the 
dependent variables, over and above the effect of upgrading to the latest version of the 
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app (which is captured by the interaction term between upgrade_groupi and 
post_upgradet). 
From column (3) of Panel A, I find that delaying upgrading to a new platform 
version does not impact the essential permissions sought by apps, as seen by coefficient 
of late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet, which is insignificant. On the other hand, from 
column (3) of Panel B, I find that apps significantly reduce seeking non-essential 
permissions. Delaying upgrade reduces apps’ ability of over-seeking non-essential 
permissions by 6.79% (i.e., {0.101 + 0.083}/2.71). This means that the apps’ ability to 
over-seek non-essential permissions further falls upon delaying upgrade. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that apps significantly reduce their information over-
seeking behavior upon delaying upgrade. 
3.4.3.3.2 Does delaying upgrading affect apps’ marketplace outcomes? 
Model (3.5) estimates the impact of upgrading on marketplace outcomes, the outcomes 
of which have been presented in panels C and D of Table 3.8. Upgrading to Android 
6.0 on time positively affects apps’ marketplace outcomes, as seen by the positive and 
significant result of coefficient upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet in column (3) of Panel 
C. This coefficient (0. 16822) means that, on an average, about 1020 app users (i.e., 0. 
16822/100* 4.04 mean rating * 150079.3 mean raters) who have previously rated the 
app, increase their rating by 1 star after the app upgraded to the latest version of the 
platform. However, delaying upgrading has a cost to pay for the apps. The coefficient 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet in column (3) suggests that delaying upgrading 
erases the potential rating gain that apps would have received. The coefficient of -
0.09237 means that delaying upgrading results in a fall in rating, an equivalent of 560 
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users reducing the rating by 1 star (i.e., 0. 09237/100* 4.04 mean rating * 150079.3 
mean raters). 
While delaying upgrade adversely affects apps’ ratings, it is unclear whether this 
adverse effect of delaying upgrade on rating are towards all apps or only those apps 
that continue to over-seek non-essential permissions. To further understand the reasons 
for this adverse effect, I perform sub-sample analyses based on the changes in 
information seeking behavior of treated apps. I divide treated apps into two groups 
based on whether apps’ permissions count falls more (or less) on average after upgrade 
as compared to before upgrade. Appendix Table A11 shows the outcomes of the sub-
sample analysis. From column (1) I find that the adverse effect of delaying upgrade on 
ratings are only towards apps that do not reduce over-seeking non-essential permissions 
after upgrade. This further supports my conjecture that strategically delaying upgrade, 
because of permission over-seeking behavior, also has rating repercussions. 
Finally, Panel D of Table 3.8 provides the outcomes of Model (3.6B), i.e., the 
impact of delaying upgrade on apps’ popularity. From column (3) of Panel D, I find 
that delaying upgrade significantly negatively affects the popularity by 9.06% 
(0.822/9.07, mean value of the popularity). I find consistent results with column (4) 
where I present weighted regression. In essence, strategically delaying upgrading to the 
latest version of Android has both monetary and reputational repercussions, while 
forcing the apps to significantly improve their sensitive information gathering 
behavior. 
3.4.3.4 Additional Robustness Checks 
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Since my data-collection process involves installing apps on emulators, there is 
potential oversampling of apps based on its popularity. Despite using a large sample of 
apps and employing global app distribution as probability weights in regression 
analysis, questions regarding generalizability of my finding may still exist. As an 
alternative test, I divide the apps into 3 groups based on the overall download 
categories: less than 1 million downloads (Low Download Group, lowDGi), 1 million 
– 5 million downloads (mediumDGi) and greater than 5 million downloads (highDGi)
31. 
I re-estimate models (5) and (6) by including a 3-way interaction term 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet*download_groupi, wherein the baseline 
comparison group is the highDG. The results are shown in Appendix Table A12.  I see 
that the outcomes of delaying upgrading to Android 6.0 on apps’ overseeking behavior 
(i.e., overseeking non-essential permissions) as well as on apps’ ratings are most 
conservative for apps in highDG, followed by apps in mediumDG and subsequently for 
those in lowDG. This indicates that the negative impact of delaying upgrading on apps’ 
rating as well as apps’ permission seeking behavior only exacerbates as I include apps 
with lower downloads. 
3.5.  Discussions  
3.5.1  Key Findings 
This study is motivated by an increasing demand by users to take control over their 
sensitive information and a dearth of research examining the impact of platforms’ 
mechanisms that seek to empower users. I investigate app’s responses to Android’s 
                                                 
31 An app might move within groups over 24 months. We categorize such apps into the group where 
they spent most of their time in. E.g., spending 8 months in lowDG and 16 months in mediumDG puts 
an app in mediumDG category 
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upgrade that changed how Android users grant permissions to apps. In investigating 
the characteristics of apps that delay upgrade, I find that the propensity to delay upgrade 
falls for high quality apps, apps that are characterized by high consumer satisfaction 
(based on user ratings), a really active consumer base (based on number of 
comments/feedback posted each month), an active maintenance cycle (based on the 
days since last update), sophisticated features (based on larger file size), high app 
demand (based on screenshots) or large download base. These characteristics are 
consistent with literature on high quality software/mobile apps (Ghose and Han 2014, 
Jung et al. 2012, Krishnan et al. 2000).  
A key finding of my investigation is that apps that seek more permissions from 
users delay upgrading to the latest version of Android. Among all permissions, the 
propensity to delay upgrade increases when apps seek permissions to collect user 
information that are known to be used for ad targeting or are considered to be sneaky 
(i.e., running in the background). Private user information such as audio conversations 
(gathered via microphone), location (gathered via GPS), users’ frequent connections 
(gathered via call logs or SMS frequency), user identity (gathered via phone status and 
identity), user content (gathered via access to phone memory) etc. are often utilized by 
ad networks to serve targeted advertisements (Goode 2018, Limer 2018). Hence, apps 
that typically benefit from in-app advertising prefer to retain control over such 
permissions by delay upgrading.  
I also find that the propensity to delay upgrade increases among apps that seek 
permissions to sensitive information that are non-essential to the app’s working. Extant 
literature on mobile security provides evidence to support this explanation. Displaying 
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in-app-advertisements when users use those apps is quite a common revenue model 
among free apps, much more than paid apps (Watanabe et al. 2017). Some apps build 
revenue models around utilizing users’ personal information in ways that users may 
not agree with (Cimpanu 2018). Some advertisement libraries that apps utilize are 
known to follow non-standard data policies such as uploading users’ sensitive 
information to remote servers or triggering code from remote servers on apps (Cimpanu 
2018, Grace et al. 2012). Such reckless practices by advertisement networks (prone to 
security and privacy vulnerabilities) are not completely without the apps’ knowledge 
(Grace et al. 2012). My investigation finds that these apps also have incentives to over-
seek non-essential permissions. Hence, when platforms enact policies to restrict 
blanket permissions to such sensitive information, such apps would choose to hold off 
upgrading to this version for as long as possible. My finding is also consistent with 
prior research that suggests that seeking sensitive information that are relevant to 
transactions will not be difficult (Zimmer et al. 2010). The findings point towards apps’ 
belief that app users will meaningfully exercise their control over privacy and grant 
only contextually relevant sensitive information to apps. 
In examining the outcomes for apps that delay upgrading to Android 6.0, I find that 
apps that delay upgrading to Android 6.0 (or higher) significantly reduce over-seeking 
the non-essential permissions. This finding is important because it suggests that giving 
fine-grained control to users over their private information not only improves apps’ 
data gathering behavior but also that it continues to improve with time. Specifically, 
this suggests that apps reduce seeking irrelevant permissions that may raise alarms in 
users’ minds. Most importantly, I find delaying upgrade significantly reduces apps’ 
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ability to overseek non-essential permissions, indicating that early movers among apps 
find it easier to obtain larger proportion of non-essential permissions. One of the 
reasons for this initial ease of obtaining permissions may be users’ uncertainty about 
breaking app functionality if they deny permissions (Hildenbrand 2018) and such 
uncertainties would go away by the time late-movers among apps upgrade.  
Investigating the marketplace outcomes for apps, I find that delaying upgrade 
potentially erases most ratings gains that apps would receive upon upgrading. 
Furthermore, the sub-sample analysis reveals that the fall in the rating are mainly for 
apps that do not reduce over-seeking non-essential permissions. Taken together, the 
findings suggest that app users are sensitive to apps’ over-seeking behavior 32. I also 
find that apps’ popularity falls upon delaying upgrade. The fall in the popularity of the 
apps can be attributed to the penalty that Android levies on apps’ core quality score for 
delaying upgrade. These findings imply that apps have a medium- to long-term price 
to pay if they delay upgrading, despite retaining control over users’ information for a 
bit longer. These findings are quite important in an open hardware platform such as 
Android. Even if an open platform cannot coerce all apps to upgrade immediately, my 
findings show that exploiting such flexibility for short-term gains comes at a cost to the 
apps.  
3.5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
I acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, similar to prior research on 
mobile app marketplaces (Garg and Telang 2013, Ghose and Han 2014), my sample 
                                                 
32 Unlike feature improvements which individual apps need to opt-in to, privacy control improvements 
are applicable to all apps. Therefore, while existing app users won’t be unhappy if apps delay feature 
enhancements, users are likely to be unhappy if they notice that apps are delaying privacy control (a 
list of all permissions is displayed each time users update the app). 
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focuses on the most popular apps at a given timeframe (April 2016). The apps have to 
be installed on an emulator for me to detect when they upgraded, which precludes the 
use of hundreds of thousands of apps in my analysis. While I put efforts to make my 
sample as representative as possible and conduct robustness checks that suggest my 
estimates are conservative, generalizability concerns limit the findings of this study to 
overall apps, particularly those at the tail-end of the download distribution. 
Furthermore, my sample is limited to those apps that can be downloaded on emulators 
from the US Play Store. We need additional studies across a larger sub-sample of apps 
that would include apps with very number of low downloads as well as those apps that 
are available only in international markets. 
Second, I rely on a statistical technique, combined with textual analysis, to derive 
the essentiality of permissions to apps’ working. While such a technique makes my 
finding conservative33, we need more research to measure the essentiality of 
permissions in alternative ways. Future research can interview app users to understand 
essentiality from users’ perspective. Future work could derive an importance measure 
of individual apps. Whether and how upgrade decisions vary with an app’s relative 
importance to users would provide additional insights. 
Third, while my study shows that apps reduce overseeking non-essential 
permissions, my study does not observe when and how the apps seek such permissions 
during run-time. There may be some apps that are successful in overseeking non-
essential permissions by “educating” app users about the necessity of such permissions 
                                                 
33 When essential permissions get tagged as non-essential, they reduce the effect size of DiD estimates 
in models estimating effects on non-essential permissions. The 75% cut off for essential permissions 
prevents non-essential permissions from being categorized as essential ones.  
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for apps’ survival. Future research should study app interface designs, specifically the 
messaging design that may convey to users why certain permissions are necessary to 
an app’s working, thereby avoiding being rejected.  
Finally, despite using a reputable matching technique in conjunction with DiD 
estimation to account for endogeneity of apps’ upgrade decisions in a quasi-
experimental setting, it is plausible that the self-selected decisions to delay upgrade 
may be influenced by other unobservable factors. We need more research to leverage 
exogenous shocks (such as platform level shocks) that would encourage some (or all) 










Chapter 4: Conclusion and Way Forward 
4.1 Conclusion and Contribution to the Literature and Practice 
The phenomenal rise of platform economy, which have been around for over a decade 
now, can be attributed to their success in enabling discovery and transactions between 
the initial generation of platform users. However, the learnings from managing the 
earlier users need not translate completely onto the new users, owing to the difference 
in the sensitivity to issues such as privacy, discrimination, digital nativity and the like. 
Furthermore, as more and more users flock to platform economy, regulators and 
policymakers have been involving in platform regulation more frequently now than 
ever. As a reaction to issues faced by one side of the platform (e.g., discrimination 
faced by guests on Airbnb) and the accompanying bad press, platforms are introducing 
policy changes aimed at empowering that side. However, such policy changes could 
elicit strategic behavior from the other side of the network too. Motivated by a rise in 
the platform policy changes that reflect both the regulatory mood of the region as well 
as the changing platform users’ preferences and behavior, my dissertation seeks to 
address the question of whether and how such policy changes impact all sides of the 
platform. More importantly, I seek to understand what the unintended consequences of 
such policy changes are, so that such findings can be used to guide policy decisions.  
I choose two distinct and prominent digital platforms: sharing economy platform 
(Airbnb) and a mobile platform (Android) and two distinct platform policy changes: 
making screening optional and enabling fine grained control over sensitive information 
to study the impact of such platform policy changes. In both these contexts, the 
voluntary nature of such policy adoptions allows me to study who adopts such policy 
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changes, why do they adopt such changes and what happens to such adopters upon 
embracing the change. Furthermore, as a study design, I focus on two critical impacts 
of such policy changes: efficiency and welfare implications, for all sides of the platform 
(e.g., guests and hosts on Airbnb, developers and users on Android), not just the side 
that is the intended beneficiary of such policy changes. 
The broader contribution of my dissertation is its investigation of what happens 
when platform design decisions increase the choices of buyers on the platform. 
Allowing hosts to forgo screening or forcing apps to provide users a fine-grained choice 
of whether or not to grant individual permissions improves the choices that renters or 
app users have. Left to market, such a transfer of power (of choice) to consumers is a 
stretch. Therefore, it is essential for platforms to enact policies that allow for 
decentralized choices. From my studies, I find that participants may treat cost-benefits 
differently, but on average, they are perceptive in terms of imposing penalties to actions 
that do not make sense. In other words, when platforms enact policies that enable 
individuals to make use of their own decentralized information, I find that there are 
both efficiency as well as welfare implications. 
The first essay informs us that a seemingly counter-intuitive choice of allowing 
sharing economy participants to forgo screening works favorably to particular sub-
group of participants who have traditionally felt marginalized on the platform. The 
emergent and growing literature on the sharing economy has increasingly attended to 
the social and economic impacts of online sharing marketplaces (e.g., Einav et al. 2016; 
Li et al. 2016; Park et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2016; Zervas et al. 2014) and examined 
how transactions are consummated in such markets (e.g., Cullen and Farronato 2014; 
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Ye et al. 2018). However, less is known about how market mechanisms should be 
designed to support the collaborative consumption activities in online sharing markets. 
Online sharing platforms are not fully regulated, and mostly rely on a variety of self-
designed mechanisms to facilitate and govern market transactions (Koopman et al. 
2014). Accordingly, they represent an opportunity to critically assess the impacts of 
market mechanisms and identify those that best serve P2P sharing markets (Luca 2017). 
My study addresses this research gap, and in doing so, contributes to the literature on 
market mechanism design and its socio-economic implications, as I elaborate below. 
So far, few studies have focused on examining screening mechanisms in online 
markets from the perspective of the party engaging in screening. In part, this may be 
because screening mechanisms have been traditionally considered a vital part of P2P 
online markets to address issues of information asymmetry (e.g., Stiglitz 1975), and 
indeed, with my study’s research context, two-way screening was part of the default 
market design. Scholars have largely assumed screening is beneficial from the focal 
agent’s perspective, even as they highlight the potential negative impact of screening 
through increased discrimination from the other agent’s perspective, and reduction in 
market efficiencies through reduced matching between agents (e.g., Cornell and Welch 
1996; Fradkin 2015; Pallais 2014; Romanyuk 2016). My study questions the 
assumption that screening is always beneficial from the focal agent’s perspective, and 
also relaxes the implicit assumption that providers within local areas have 
homogeneous demand characteristics. Accordingly, my empirical examination of 
when, and for whom forgoing screening may result in better outcomes reveals that 
individual agents assess their own relative benefits and costs across implementing and 
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forgoing screening. In doing so, I provide evidence that the perceived risk of 
encountering “lemons” in online markets may be offset by greater economic benefits. 
I show that agents act consistently with this cost-benefit calculus when determining 
whether forgoing screening is individually optimal given the demand conditions facing 
their offerings. 
The study also contributions to the literature on online markets by highlighting the 
roles of race/ethnicity and gender in understanding participant behavior. Prior studies 
have shown the presence of racial discrimination against African American hosts on 
Airbnb (e.g., Edelman et al. 2017; Kakar et al. 2017), and my results suggest the 
increased convenience provided through their voluntary forgoing of screening offsets 
taste-based bias in guests, such that African American hosts benefit from higher 
occupancy levels at lower costs (in terms of reduced reviewer ratings), relative to White 
hosts. Similarly, I show that women are more likely to forgo screening than men, and 
their greater benefits as compared to men largely relate to their ability to maintain price, 
rather than increase occupancy rates.  Regardless of whether through occupancy rates 
or through listing price, my study provides evidence of higher economic benefits to 
African American and female hosts when they choose to forgo screening. In doing so, 
my findings not only complement existing literature on how online market participants 
respond to mechanism design (e.g., Bapna et al. 2004; Ye et al. 2014), but add to the 
growing literature on the roles of race/ethnicity and gender in online markets (e.g., 
Chan and Wang 2017; Edelman et al. 2017). 
Practically, my findings provide important implications for online market platform 
design, and for participants in these markets. Within my focal context, Airbnb has 
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steadily gained in market share of temporary rentals, and as a recent entrant into the 
hospitality industry, eroded the dominance of traditional hotel chains (e.g., Zervas et 
al. 2014). While initially operating under the assumption that two-way screening was 
critical for information asymmetry reduction, Airbnb’s market design precluded the 
“instant booking” norm in hotel chains.  In so doing, it failed to cater to the convenience 
and time preferences of guests, and also increased concerns regarding discrimination 
of guests by hosts. My systematic investigation of their recent policy change to enable 
both traditional and instant booking option provides evidence that guests react 
positively to instant booking, and this may even offset their taste-based bias. I also 
show that hosts themselves benefit with having more choices, particularly when they 
are new entrants, have yet to build their reputation and quality signals, or face lower or 
declining demand.  The option to forgo or implement screening provides them more 
degrees of freedom in customizing their choices: they can assess their own trade-offs 
between increased occupancy rate/prices and reduced review ratings, thereby 
increasing overall benefits in the market. Of course, critical to such outcomes are other 
features of market design; it may well be that signaling and insurance mechanisms to 
offset information asymmetry in Airbnb permit screening to be an option.  
Moving beyond Airbnb, other online platforms may also benefit from my study, 
inasmuch as they assess their own overall design, and determine whether forgoing 
screening can be made optional to serve as an additional sorting tool that differentiates 
participants with different trade-offs between occupancy, price, and ratings. 
My second study on privacy policy change on Android guides the literature on 
platform mechanism design by showing that altering privacy policies to make choices 
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less costly to users improves apps’ information gathering behaviors. Platforms’ 
proactive measures to reduce users’ cost of exercising control over their information 
may help address the privacy paradox that has been documented in privacy literature. 
By showing that even popular apps systematically lower permission over-seeking for 
information that are not relevant for apps’ working, I highlight the role of platform 
mechanisms under a power asymmetry in safeguarding users’ interest. The fact that 
users acknowledge the change in privacy control indicates that the Android’ strategy 
to improve the information security, by reducing the costs of making privacy choices, 
seems successful.  
While extant research has investigated the buyers’ perspective to information 
privacy, this study investigates the sellers’ responses to exogenous changes in 
information gathering policies. In doing so, I also add to the literature on early movers 
by showing that upgrading to the latest version at the earliest is beneficial for an app’s 
outcome in the marketplace, despite potentially disrupting its revenues in the short run. 
Alternatively, I also show that strategically delaying adhering to policies harm the 
sellers’ outcomes on the platform, not just revenue losses (reduction in non-essential 
permissions and popularity) but also platform reputational losses (erasure of potential 
gain in ratings). Finally, my research informs platform strategy by suggesting that a 
fragmented platform such as Android should carefully design its upgrade window. 
Providing a longer time-horizon may induce strategic behavior among sellers that may 
not be optimal for the participants or the platform. 
In both my studies, I have focused on organically embedding some of the modern 
text mining and machine learning techniques along with rigorous econometric analysis. 
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A key strength of modern machine learning/neural network techniques is to uncover 
the richness of data to guide the model choice and research design. For example, in 
case of the Airbnb essay, I used neural networks to train a comments analysis model 
that distinguished positive statements from specific complaints. I also used sentiment 
analysis techniques to understand how the sentiments have changed with the change in 
the guest type due to instant booking. I also used neural network based image 
recognition tool to provide confidence to my manual tagging of host images to 
determine host race/ethnicity and gender. In the Android App essay, I contribute to the 
literature on privacy preferences by combining advanced text mining techniques with 
permission prevalence analysis to distinguish essential sensitive information from non-
essential ones. While such a technique is used by platforms such as Google, to detect 
whether apps are over-seeking permissions or not, this is not too commonly used in 
social sciences research. By employing a modern vector embedding technique 
(Word2Vec), I demonstrate that users, despite expressing preferences to controlling 
sensitive information sharing, are willing to trade-off contextually essential sensitive 
information to derive utility from apps. 
In summary, the studies shed light on critical choices made in market design, and 
their subsequent impact on market participants’ choices and outcomes.  I show that 
rather than a “one size fits all” policy under the assumption that market participants 
equally desire the same protection against information asymmetry, provision of options 
to individually assess the benefits and costs associated with policies allows for more 
decentralized and heterogeneous choices, with associated increases in market outcomes 
and, thereby, social welfare implications. More importantly, my studies show that 
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platforms need to take into account the strategic moves by the all sides of the network, 
while designing and implementing policy changes. 
4.2 Way Forward 
My dissertation highlights the importance of understanding the consequences of 
platform policy changes on outcomes for all sides of the platform. Both the studies are 
observational studies where I studied the outcome based on archival data. A natural 
extension of my dissertation is to study the impact of mechanism designs in the field 
by introducing novel mechanism designs on platforms that stand to gain from altering 
the way users interact on the platform. By carefully analyzing how different sides on 
such platforms currently interact and identifying the implicit assumptions around such 
interaction mechanisms, introducing policy changes in a randomized control trial 
would be useful. 
4.2.1 Smart TV Platform 
One such platforms would be a traditional content consumption platform such as the 
Television. Over the past decade, television has transitioned from a broadcast content 
consumption device to a multi-faceted entertainment device. About 70% of all TVs 
sold in 2018 are “Smart TVs” (Statista 2018c), i.e., televisions that have internet 
connectivity to support over-the-air content streaming, internet content consumption or 
interactive content (for example, Black Mirror: Bandersnatch). Their ability to take 
input from (and potentially provide output to) multiple connected smart devices and 
digital assistants has promised to change the way consumers interact with TVs and 
consume TV content. In essence, the TV has transformed from a simplex (one-sided) 
communication platform (i.e., from broadcaster to consumer) into an interactive 
platform. Despite an explosion in over-the-air content consumption, US viewers spend 
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about 79% of their content consumption time consuming linear TV (Nielsen 2018). 
This has provided Broadcast TV channels and marketers with an opportunity to utilize 
smart TV platforms for a rich, interactive engagement with consumers. 
The current stream of communication between advertisers/marketers and the 
content consumers on TV has been one-sided; therefore, the ad is broadcast on TV 
without much customization and micro targeting. The implicit assumption here is that 
the consumers self-select into remembering the advertisements they are interested in. 
Therefore, advertisers have relied on creativity to condense advertisement messages 
and ad-repetition to improve brand recall while at shopping aisles (Elsen et al. 2011; 
Lehnert et al. 2013). Smart connected TVs are in a perfect position to mitigate the 
temporal disconnect when the content is consumed and when it is utilized. 
Technologies on a smart TV can allow TV viewers to “bookmark” an on-TV 
advertisement and forward the bookmark to their connected smart phone. This can, in 
turn, help marketers to customize the message as consumers progress through the 
purchase funnel on a second screen. Figure 4.1 illustrates multi-screen content 
customization that the smart TV platform enables to advertisers. 
The platform level interventions that I propose make use of two unique aspects of 
linear TV viewing on a smart TV platform. The first is the time-shift aspect for an 
advertisement where a user can postpone the processing of the ad message to a later 
time (and another device). This means that my interventions can exploit the unique 
temporal dimension of linear TV viewing (i.e., when the TV ad is going to start and 
end). The second aspect is that this setup provides a multi-level, multi-device 
interactivity. This means that my interventions can make use of the two-staged (on-TV 
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and on-Mobile) interactions with self-selected consumers. The former aspect guides 
my message framing on-TV and the latter aspect guides my intervention design in two-
stages. 
4.2.1.1   Intervention Message Framing on-TV 
The interventions on-TV represent an early stage in a consumer decision-making 
process. The key goal of on-TV intervention is to persuade viewers, who are in a 
content-consumption mode, to postpone ad-message processing to their convenient 
time. To achieve this time-shift, I propose using variants of temporal information as 
described above. I draw on consumer decision-making literature to frame the 
persuasive messages. Since the early stage of a consumer’s decision-making process 
has more uncertainty about shopping goals (Lee and Ariely 2006), any intervention that 
helps reduce this uncertainty increases the response in early stages. Interventions with 
convenience framing (such as, providing context relevant information (e.g., Goic et al. 
2019) or interest customized information (e.g., Fong 2017)), or negative framing (such 
as scarcity framing (e.g., Luo et al. 2019)) have been shown improve response in early 
stages of decision-making. Thus, I use convenience and scarcity temporal framing on-
TV. 
To understand which of these framings (positive vs negative framing) may be more 
effective, I refer to the risk preference literature. Responding to an on-TV marketing 
intervention represents a trade-off between convenience (customized product 
information without remembering and searching) and privacy (exposing their interest 
to marketers). Thus, for a TV viewer interested in the product, responding to 
intervention is a risky choice compared to remembering and searching information by 
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themselves. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) show that people display risk seeking 
(aversion) when exposed to negative (positive) framing. Therefore, I postulate that 
negative framing (scarcity framing) better persuades users to respond to on-TV 
intervention. However, positive framing is shown to be more persuasive under low 
involvement situations such as with product advertisement (Maheswaran and Meyers-
Levy 1990). Thus, it is worth empirically exploring how positive vs negative temporal 
framing impacts the final outcome (such as download, sales or test drive). 
The two-staged design also provides information on other similar viewers’ actions, 
i.e., social information. Theories on social influence suggest that social information 
cues significantly improve the outcomes for early stages (Aral and Walker 2011; 
Bakshy et al. 2012) as well as for late stages (Sun et al. 2019). The two distinct 
components of social influence: social learning and network effect/utility (e.g., Sun et 
al. 2019) seem to affect consumer decision making at different stages. Social learning 
cues helps reduce the uncertainty around a product’s demand in early stages of 
decision-making. Similarly, social utility cues help gauge the positive utility from 
purchasing certain products in late stages of decision-making. For example, cues that 
indicate how many people have test driven a new car helps gauge the waiting period or 
the corresponding accessories market. While I expect social information cues to impact 
both the stages, it is unclear from the literature how much impact social information 
has on these two stages. Finally, it would also be interesting to study the interaction 
between social information and the convenience-scarcity framing. Especially since the 
effectiveness of convenience vs scarcity framing depends on consumers’ involvement 
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in message processing, it would be interesting to understand if social information alters 
this effectiveness. 
4.2.1.2    Intervention Design 
The key intuition here is that different types of nudges/cues/information works 
differently on early vs late stages. As mentioned above, I propose using two variants 
of temporal information (convenience vs scarcity framing) as on-TV nudges. The social 
information nudge will be used both on-TV and on-Phone. 
4.2.1.2.1   Temporal Information: The convenience framing would be “Bookmark 
the coupon now, use it at convenience” while the scarcity framing would be “You have 
30 seconds to save this coupon”. We use these two framing independently and in 
combination with the social information nudge (this makes a total of four treatment 
groups and a control group). The idea is to provide short and crisp cues on TV to 
persuade viewers to time-shift their decision-making to a convenient time.  
4.2.1.2.2   Social Information: Other similar users’ actions have been shown to be 
effective in social networking context (e.g., Bakshy et al. 2012). It would be interesting 
to know whether and in what stage (i.e., on-TV vs on-Phone) such information would 
be effective. An example of a social information would be “3214 viewers watching 
NPR News in Naperville, IL have bookmarked this coupon”.  
4.2.2 Policy Simulations 
Finally, since we are interested in informing platform policymakers about the impact 
of such policy changes, another extension of my dissertation would be to simulate 
policy actions and perform counterfactual analysis of policy enactment. For example, 
both the policies that I study in my dissertation have looked at the impact of voluntary 
adoption of the features on their outcomes. A policymaker in Airbnb or Android would 
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be interested in studying the impact of making such a policy mandatory (instead of 
optional) or study the impact of altering (shortening or increasing) the time-window of 
such policy enactment.  It would be valuable to setup structural models (e.g., Ghose 





Table 2.1: Variable Explanation 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variables  
instant_bookableit If listing i has enabled instant booking in month t. 
occupancyit Ratio of number of days listing i is booked to number of days the room is marked as available for booking 
in month t. 
priceit Price per night stay for listing i in month t (in US dollars). 
ratingit The cumulative review rating of listing i by the end of month t. 
traditional_bookableit If listing i which switched to instant booking earlier switches back to traditional booking in month t. 
Listing Demand Characteristics 
Δoccupancyit-1 The change in occupancy from month t-2 to month t-1, i.e., occupancyit-1 - occupancyit-2. 
Δpriceit-1 The change in price from month t-2 to month t-1, i.e., priceit-1 - priceit-2. 
Δratingit-1 The change in rating from month t-2 to month t-1, i.e., ratingit-1 - ratingit-2. 
occupancy_change_percentit The percentage change in listing i’s monthly occupancy due to instant booking by the end of month t, 
measured as (average monthly occupancy between the switching month 0 and month t - average monthly 
occupancy in months before the switching month) / average monthly occupancy in months before the 
switching month 0.  
price_change_percentit The percentage change in listing i’s price due to instant booking by the end of month t, measured as 
(average listing price between the switching month 0 and month t - average listing price in months before 
the switching month / average listing price in months before the switching month 0. 
rating_change_percentit The percentage change in listing i’s review rating due to instant booking by the end of month t, measured 
as (review rating by the end of month t - review rating before the switching month 0) / review rating before 
the switching month 0. 
inst_book_groupi If listing i has ever switched to instant booking. 
post_switcht If month t is after the month of switching to instant booking by the treated listing (i.e., if t>0).   
switchback_groupi If listing i has even switched to instant booking first and then switched back to traditional booking. 
post_switchbackt If month t is after the month of switching back to traditional booking by the treated listing (i.e., if t>0). 
average_occupancyit The mean of the occupancy of the listing from the start of the panel till the month t. 
competitor_instant_bookableit Percentage of competitors in listing i’s neighborhood that have enabled instant booking in month t. 
competitor_superhostit Percentage of Superhosts in listing i’s neighborhood in month t. 






host_is_superhostit If the host of listing i is recognized by Airbnb as a Superhost in month t. 
host_tenureit Number of days the host of listing i has been on Airbnb by the end of month t. 
host_is_professionalit If the host of listing i is considered as a professional host (i.e., with 3 or more listings) in month t.34 
genderi A vector of dummies indicating if the gender of host of the listing i is male, female or uncertain 
race/ethnicityi A vector of dummies indicating if the race/ethnicity of the host of listing i is African American, Asian, 
Hispanic, White or uncertain  
Control Variables  
review_countit Cumulative number of reviews listing i receives by the end of month t. 
min_stayit Listing i’s minimum number of nights required for a booking in month t. 
photosit Number of photos posted for listing i in month t. 
popularityit Number of times listing i appears in the recommended list of similar listings in month t.  
month_dummyt A vector of dummies indicating if month t is January, February, etc.  
cancellation_policyit A vector of dummies indicating if the cancellation policy of listing i in month t is flexible, moderate, strict, 
super-strict or no-refund  




Table 2.2: Distributions of Host Race/Ethnicity and Host Gender 
Race/Ethnicity Count Percentage Gender Count Percentage 
White 7667 55.73 female 6638 48.25 
African American 1712 12.44 male 5984 43.50 
Asian 1369 9.95 uncertain 1135 8.25 
Hispanic 1367 9.94    
Uncertain 1642 11.94    
Total 13757 100%  13757 100% 
 
 
                                                 
34 We follow the definition of professional host by New York State Office of The Attorney General (see https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf).  
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Table 2.3 Switching to Instant Booking 
Dependent variable (1) 
Logit - instant_bookableit 
(2) 
Logit - instant_bookableit 
occupancyit-1 2.375*** (0.227) 2.423*** (0.228) 
occupancyit-1 * occupancyit-1 -1.436*** (0.202) -1.432*** (0.203) 
Δoccupancyit-1 -0.296*** (0.070) -0.312*** (0.070) 
priceit-1 -0.001*** (0.225 x10-3) -0.001*** (0.219 x10-3) 
Δpriceit-1 -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
ratingit-1 -0.010*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) 
Δratingit-1 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 
review_countit-1 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 
host_is_superhostit -0.352*** (0.061) -0.339*** (0.062) 
host_tenureit -0.001*** (0.690x10-4) -0.001*** (0.695 x10-4) 
host_is_professionalit 0.695*** (0.041) 0.667*** (0.042) 
malei   -0.196*** (0.039) 
uncertaini   0.120 (0.063) 
genderi=femalei (baseline)     
Whitei   -0.137* (0.061) 
African Americani   0.311*** (0.070) 
Asiani   -0.366*** (0.081) 
Hispanici   0.103 (0.076) 
race/ethnicityi=uncertaini (baseline)     
min_stayit -0.019* (0.009) -0.020* (0.009) 
photosit 0.018*** (0.001) 0.017*** (0.001) 
popularityit 0.220x10-4 (0.101x10-3) 0.302x10-4 (0.105x10-3) 
competitor_instant_bookableit 0.881*** (0.116) 0.827*** (0.117) 
competitor_superhostit -0.520** (0.177) -0.515** (0.177) 
competitor_review_countit -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Constant -3.148*** (0.125) -3.160*** (0.132) 
R-Squared/Pseudo R2 0.077 0.082 
Cancellation Policy Dummies YES YES 
Room Type Control YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES 
 # of Obs. 117746 
(Obs. after switch dropped) 
117746 
(Obs. after switch dropped) 
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Table 2.4. Distributions of Host Race/Ethnicity and Host Gender 
Race/Ethnicity Pre-Match Post-Match (Overall) Post-Match (Treated) Post-Match (Control) 
White 56.16% 55.10% 52.74% 57.45% 
African American 12.21% 13.53% 14.03% 13.02% 
Asian 9.78% 9.85% 10.54% 9.17% 
Hispanic 9.83% 10.24% 10.43% 10.05% 
Uncertain 12.01% 11.28% 12.26% 10.31% 
Gender Pre-Match Post-Match (Overall) Post-Match (Treated) Post-Match (Control) 
female 48.25% 47.78% 47.42% 48.13% 
male 43.50% 44.18% 44.50% 43.85% 
uncertain 8.25% 8.04% 8.08% 8.02% 
 
Table 2.5. The Effects of Forgoing Screening 
Dependent variable (1) 
3SLS - Occupancyit 
(2) 
3SLS - Priceit 
(3) 
3SLS - Ratingit 
priceit 0.200x10-3* (0.805x10-4)   -0.009*** (0.002) 
ratingit-1 0.001*** (0.137x10-3) 0.008 (0.014) 0.097*** (0.003) 
average_occupancyit-1 -0.229*** (0.014) 11.458*** (1.472)   
occupancyit     13.586*** (1.473) 
review_countit-1 0.001*** (0.158x10-3) 0.053*** (0.016) -0.014*** (0.003) 
host_tenureit -0.662x10-4*** (0.176x10-4) 0.064*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.364x10-3) 
host_is_professionalit -0.014 (0.020) 5.368** (2.077) 0.109 (0.426) 
popularityit 0.235x10-4 (0.195x10-4) -0.006** (0.002) -0.220x10-3 (0.409x10-4) 
post_switcht 0.002 (0.004) 4.716*** (0.447) 0.416*** (0.092) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht 0.073*** (0.006) 0.319 (0.612) -1.078*** (0.160) 
Constant 0.028 (0.094) -151.086*** (9.367) 69.593*** (1.957) 
Month Dummies YES YES YES  
Listing Fixed Effect YES YES YES  
Cancellation Policy Dummies YES YES YES  
# of Obs. 41,171 41,171 41,171  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 2.6. The Effects of Forgoing Screening: The Role of Host Race/Ethnicity and Gender 
Dependent Variable            (1) 
3SLS - Occupancyit 
(2) 
3SLS - Priceit 
(3) 
3SLS - Ratingit 
priceit 0.199x10-3* (0.806x10-4)   -0.009*** (0.002) 
ratingit-1 0.001*** (0.137x10-3) 0.008 (0.014) 0.097*** (0.003) 
average_occupancyit-1 -0.231*** (0.014) 11.276*** (1.474)   
occupancyit     13.356*** (1.450) 
review_countit-1 0.001*** (0.158x10-3) 0.054*** (0.016) -0.013*** (0.003) 
host_tenureit -0.663x10-4*** (0.176x10-4) 0.064*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.361x10-3) 
host_is_professionalit -0.012 (0.020) 5.620** (2.077) 0.049 (0.423) 
popularityit 0.233x10-4 (0.195x10-4) -0.006** (0.002) -0.221x10-3 (0.406x10-3) 
post_switcht 0.002 (0.004) 4.708*** (0.446) 0.415*** (0.092) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht 0.079*** (0.014) 0.078 (1.438) -1.397*** (0.309) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*genderi=malei 0.002 (0.010) -4.280*** (1.007) -0.017 (0.205) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*genderi=uncertaini -0.086*** (0.023) -1.701 (2.362) 1.569** (0.491) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*genderi=femalei (baseline) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*ethnicityi=Whitei 0.004 (0.015) 2.166 (1.496) 0.235 (0.304) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*ethnicityi=African Americani -0.026 (0.018) -0.527 (1.843) 1.149** (0.375) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*ethnicityi=Asiani -0.036 (0.020) 7.102*** (2.013) 0.017 (0.413) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*ethnicityi=Hispanici 0.025 (0.020) 4.496* (2.037) -0.203 (0.416) 
inst_book_groupi*post_switcht*ethnicityi=uncertaini (baseline) 
Constant 0.027 (0.094) -151.445*** (9.364) 69.708*** (1.942) 
Month Dummies            YES YES YES 
Listing Fixed Effect            YES YES YES 
Cancellation Policy Dummies            YES YES YES 
# of Obs.            41,171 41,171 41,171 







Table 2.7. Comparison of Host Quality: African American vs. White 
 Ratings Before Forgoing Screening 
 African American White African American vs. White Difference t-test 
Switchers 89.76 89.98 -1.47 
Non-Switchers 90.80 92.82 -29.07*** 
Overall 90.52 92.38 -29.23*** 
 Positive Mentions and Negative Complaints per Comment 




African American vs. White Difference t-test:  
Before (After) 
Positive Mentions 5.47 (4.98) 5.26 (4.72) 1.33 (4.85***) 
Room Complaints 0.123 (0.989) 0.119 (0.105) 0.28 (-0.95) 
Noise Complaints 0.174 (0.155) 0.157 (0.152) 1.07 (0.38) 
Location Complaints 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.83 (-1.75) 
Maintenance Complaints 0.032 (0.029) 0.032 (0.030) -0.03 (-0.08) 
Host Complaints 0.079 (0.071) 0.076 (0.076) 0.34 (-0.79) 
Amenities Complaints 0.027 (0.035) 0.031 (0.030) -0.61 (1.54) 
Total Negative Complaints 0.435 (0.389) 0.416 (0.393) 0.63 (-0.20) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
 
Table 2.8. Comparison of Host Quality and Price: Female vs. Male 
 Ratings Before Forgoing Screening 
 Female Male Female vs. Male Difference t-test 
Switchers 89.84 89.59 2.11* 
Non-Switchers 92.23 92.36 -2.90** 
Overall 91.82 91.86 -1.00 
 Listing Price at Various Occupancy Ranges 
 Female Male Female vs. Male Difference t-test 
0-20% 140.45 178.70 -2.61** 
20-40% 131.46 151.64 -2.65** 
40-60% 145.97 148.27 -0.39 
40-80% 145.18 154.35 -2.66** 
80-100% 137.30 142.30 -2.73** 




Table 2.9. Summary of Major Findings 
Research Questions Major Findings 
RQ 1: When and who switches to 
forgoing screening? 
 Forgoing screening is more likely when listings experience: 
o Mid-range occupancies, or greater recent declines in occupancies. 
o Listings with higher local competition, and listings whose competitors 
have forgone screening. 
 Forgoing screening is more likely by: 
o New hosts, professional hosts, and non-Superhosts 
o African American hosts, relative to White hosts. 
o Female hosts, relative to male hosts. 
RQ 2: What are the outcomes 
associated with forgoing screening, 
and how do these differ based on host 
characteristics? 
 Occupancy rates increase by an average of 13.52% (1.79 nights per month), 
listing prices do not change, translating to $300.23 increased revenue per 
month. Review ratings decrease by an average of 1.20% (1.079 points) 
 African American hosts have a 3.75% higher increase in occupancy rates, and 
their review ratings have a 1.28% lower decrease, relative to White hosts. 
 Female hosts have similar increases in occupancies and decreases in ratings, 





Table 3. 1. Variable Explanation 
Variable Description 
Key Variables  
dangerous_permissionsit Count of dangerous permissions sought by app i in month t 
essential_dangerous_permissionsit Count of essential dangerous permissions sought by app i in month t 
nonessential_dangerous_permissionsit Count of non-essential dangerous permissions sought by app i in month t 
normal_permissionsit Count of normal10 permissions sought by app i in month t 
upgradeit A dummy variable indicating if the app i upgrades to Android 6.0 (or above) in the month t. 
ratingit The cumulative user rating of app i by the end of month t. 
popularityit The popularity of app i by the end of month t, computed using the weighted PageRank algorithm 
App Characteristics 
rating_countit Total count of ratings given by raters for app i by the end of month t. 
dayssinceupdateit Count of days since updating app i as measured at the end of month t 
screenshotsit Count of screenshots 35 (including optional video) uploaded by app i to Play Store by the end of 
month t 
developer_appcountit Number of apps in Play Store by the developer of app i of month t 
filesizeit 
inAppAdvertisingit 
File size (in MB) of app i by the end of month t 
A dummy variable indicating if app i displays ads in the month t  
inAppPurchasesit A dummy variable indicating if app i allows in-app purchases in the month t 
Control Variables  
category_groupi App category group that app i belongs to. 
download_bucketit Download bucket (group) that app i belongs to at the end of month t. 
month_dummyt A vector of dummies that represent if month t is April-2016, May-2017, etc. 
Note: Missing values in file sizes (such as “varies with devices” or months when file sizes were not displayed in Play Store) are handled by replacing them with 
(a) values carried forward from previous months, or (b) mean value of file-size of that app or (c) file-sizes of all apps in a sub-category for the month in the order. 
                                                 
35 Play Store mandates that a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 8 screenshots per target category (phone, tablet, TV and Wear OS) may be uploaded on the Play 
Store. If the developer has uploaded a video, we count it as a screenshot.  https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/1078870?hl=en 
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Table 3. 2. Analysis of Upgrading to Latest Version of Android 




dangerous_permissions_ratioit -0.005*** (0.001) 0.995*** (0.001) 
Δrating_countit 0.000*** (0.000) 1.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit  0.067* (0.030) 1.069* (0.032) 
gamesi -0.136*** (0.036) 0.872*** (0.032) 
personal_appsi -0.082 (0.043) 0.921 (0.040) 
utility_mobilespecifici -0.145*** (0.041) 0.865*** (0.036) 
utility_mobileaccessi 0.041 (0.049) 1.041 (0.051) 
learn_explorei 0.082 (0.043) 1.085 (0.047) 
categoryi=content_consumptioni (baseline)     
below_1millioni -0.093*** (0.024) 0.911*** (0.022) 
5million_10millioni  0.040 (0.038) 1.040 (0.039) 
10million_50millioni 0.182*** (0.043) 1.200*** (0.051) 
above_50millioni 0.079 (0.096) 1.082 (0.104) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)     
dayssinceupdateit -0.004*** (0.000) 0.996*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.012*** (0.002) 1.012*** (0.002) 
filesizeit 0.002*** (0.000) 1.002*** (0.000) 
Developer Controls YES  
Log Likelihood -71426.18  
AIC 142884.4  
BIC 143043.3  
 # of Obs. 152,190  
 Χ2 1440.90  
P 0.000  





Table 3. 3. Analysis of Upgrading to Latest Version of Android 
Dependent variable - upgradeit Model (2) Point Estimates Model (2) Hazard Ratio 
location_coarseit 0.095** (0.035) 1.099** (0.038) 
location_preciseit -0.073* (0.037) 0.930* (0.034) 
access_bodysensorsit 0.062 (0.276) 1.064 (0.294) 
make_phonecallit 0.022 (0.057) 1.023 (0.058) 
access_camerait 0.069* (0.033) 1.071* (0.036) 
find_accountsit 0.104*** (0.026) 1.110*** (0.029) 
reroute_outgoingcallsit -0.119 (0.116) 0.888 (0.103) 
read_phonestatus_and_identityit -0.476*** (0.025) 0.621*** (0.016) 
read_smsit 0.027 (0.096) 1.027 (0.098) 
receive_mmsit 0.053 (0.075) 1.054 (0.079) 
record_audioit -0.107* (0.042) 0.899* (0.038) 
send_smsit -0.169 (0.090) 0.845 (0.076) 
make_sip_callit 0.648 (0.334) 1.911 (0.639) 
add_voicemailit -0.198 (0.842) 0.820 (0.691) 
read_write_phonememoryit -0.068* (0.029) 0.934* (0.027) 
read_write_calendarit -0.010 (0.075) 0.990 (0.074) 
read_write_calllogit -0.637*** (0.097) 0.529*** (0.051) 
read_write_contactit 0.132** (0.046) 1.141** (0.052) 
Δrating_countit 0.000*** (0.000) 1.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit  0.098** (0.031) 1.103** (0.034) 
gamesi -0.107** (0.037) 0.898** (0.033) 
personal_appsi -0.077 (0.044) 0.926 (0.040) 
utility_mobilespecifici -0.126** (0.042) 0.882** (0.037) 
utility_mobileaccessi 0.016 (0.051) 1.016 (0.052) 
learn_explorei 0.028 (0.044) 1.028 (0.045) 
categoryi=content_consumptioni (baseline)     
below_1millioni -0.085*** (0.024) 0.919*** (0.022) 
5million_10millioni  0.062 (0.038) 1.063 (0.040) 
10million_50millioni 0.221*** (0.043) 1.248*** (0.054) 
above_50millioni 0.152 (0.095) 1.164 (0.110) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)     
dayssinceupdateit -0.004*** (0.000) 0.996*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.011*** (0.002) 1.011*** (0.002) 
filesizeit 0.002*** (0.000) 1.002*** (0.000) 
Developer Controls YES  
Log Likelihood -71173.32  
AIC 142412.6  
BIC 142740.4  
 # of Obs. 152,190  
 Χ2 1976.79  
P 0.000  










Table 3. 4. Analysis of Upgrading to Earlier Version of Android 
Dependent variable   (1) Hazard Ratios 
upgrade_api22it 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit 1.005*** (0.001) 
Δrating_countit 1.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit  1.102*** (0.029) 
gamesi 0.798*** (0.026) 
personal_appsi 0.971 (0.036) 
utility_mobilespecifici 0.913* (0.033) 
utility_mobileaccessi 1.002 (0.043) 
learn_explorei 1.063 (0.040) 
categoryi=content_consumptioni (baseline)   
below_1millioni 0.846*** (0.017) 
5million_10millioni  1.007 (0.037) 
10million_50millioni 1.338*** (0.056) 
above_50millioni 1.159 (0.111) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)   
dayssinceupdateit 0.997*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 1.013*** (0.002) 
filesizeit 1.001*** (0.000) 
Developer Controls YES 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -84962.99 
AIC 169958 
BIC 170112.6 
 # of Obs. 116,157 
 Χ2 1653.18 
p 0.000 





Table 3. 5. Analysis of Upgrading to Latest Version of Android 
 
Dependent variable - upgradeit  (1) Hazard Ratios (2) Hazard Ratios 
essential_dangerous_permissions_ratioit 1.005** (0.002)   
nonessential_dangerous_permissions_ratioit   0.993*** (0.001) 
Δrating_countit 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
ratingit  1.087** (0.033) 1.079* (0.033) 
gamesi 0.898** (0.033) 0.874*** (0.032) 
personal_appsi 0.927 (0.040) 0.924 (0.040) 
utility_mobilespecifici 0.867*** (0.036) 0.872*** (0.036) 
utility_mobileaccessi 1.000 (0.049) 1.030 (0.050) 
learn_explorei 1.090* (0.047) 1.079 (0.046) 
categoryi=content_consumptioni (baseline)     
below_1millioni 0.916*** (0.022) 0.912*** (0.022) 
5million_10millioni  1.043 (0.040) 1.049 (0.040) 
10million_50millioni 1.214*** (0.052) 1.221*** (0.053) 
above_50millioni 1.317* (0.146) 1.334** (0.148) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)     
dayssinceupdateit 0.996*** (0.000) 0.996*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 1.012*** (0.002) 1.012*** (0.002) 
filesizeit 1.002*** (0.000) 1.002*** (0.000) 
Developer Controls YES YES 
Log Likelihood -71444.006 -71421.54 
AIC 142920 142875.1 
BIC 143078.9 143034 
 # of Obs. 152,190 152,190 
Χ2 1347.76 1393.79 
P 0.000 0.000 






Table 3. 6. 2SRI with Individual Frailty (2SRI-F) approach 
Panel A: First Stage Linear Models – essential and non-essential dangerous permissions 
Dependent variable (1) 
Linear FE Model (First Stage)  
essential permissions 
(2) 
Linear FE Model (First Stage)  
non-essential permissions 
inAppAdvertisingit -0.026 (0.027) 0.128** (0.042) 
Δrating_countit -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) 
ratingit  -0.022 (0.176) 0.562* (0.280) 
below_1millioni -0.128*** (0.038) -0.075 (0.061) 
5million_10millioni  0.072 (0.047) 0.208** (0.075) 
10million_50millioni -0.061 (0.077) 0.078 (0.123) 
above_50millioni -0.316* (0.146) 0.635** (0.232) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)     
dayssinceupdateit 0.000*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.009 (0.017) -0.062* (0.027) 
filesizeit 0.002** (0.000) 0.002* (0.001) 
Constant 13.503*** (0.752) 21.010*** (1.197) 
Developer Controls YES YES 
 # of Obs. 152,190 152,190 
R-Squared 0.813 0.867 





Panel B: Proportional Hazard – essential and non-essential dangerous Permissions 
Dependent variable (1) 
CoxPH Model (Second Stage)  
essential Permissions 
(2) 
CoxPH Model (Second Stage)  
non-essential Permissions 
nonessential_dangerous_permissions_ratioit   -0.008*** (0.001) 
essential_dangerous_permissions_ratioit 0.007*** 0.007***   
Δrating_countit 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit  0.075* 0.075* 0.066* (0.032) 
gamesi -0.108 *** -0.108 *** -0.139*** (0.039) 
personal_appsi -0.082 -0.082 -0.081 (0.046) 
utility_mobilespecifici -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.140 *** (0.044) 
utility_mobileaccessi -0.005 -0.005 0.032 (0.054) 
learn_explorei 0.086+ 0.086+ 0.078 (0.047) 
categoryi=content_consumptioni (baseline)     
below_1millioni -0.086 *** -0.086 *** -0.092*** (0.026) 
5million_10millioni  0.037 0.037 0.042 (0.042) 
10million_50millioni 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.182*** (0.041) 
above_50millioni 0.084 0.084 0.085 (0.084) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)     
dayssinceupdateit -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** (0.002) 
filesizeit 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** (0.000) 
residuals_first_stageit -0.007 -0.007 0.002 (0.002) 
Developer Controls YES YES 
Log Likelihood -71424.4 -71403.8 
AIC 142903.238 142862.037 
 # of Obs. 152,190 152,190 
Χ2 1922(p=0.000) 1963 (p=0.000) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; 
Estimation induced random error is accounted by using individual frailties in the Second Stage. 
F-test for instrument in first stage for model (1)  is 0.99, indicating that the instrument is weak. Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic cannot reject (p val. =0.321) the null hypothesis that first stage is under-identified for model (1). 
F-test for instrument in first stage for model (2) is 9.093, which is greater than Stock-Yogo F test value at 15% 
maximal IV size (i.e., 8.96). Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic rejects (p val. =0.003) the null hypothesis that first stage 
is under-identified for model (2). 
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Rating 4.01 4.03 4.00 -0.03 -17.53 4.00 4.01 0.01 1.20 
Rating Count 123188 153233 106024 -47209 -12.06 73624 75736 2112 0.25 
File Size 24.00 25.28 23.30 -1.98 -17.19 23.79 24.45 0.66 1.22 
Screenshots 12.26 12.55 12.09 -0.46 -17.86 12.73 12.51 -0.22 -1.45 
dayssinceupdate 193.88 122.57 234.63 112.06 122.40 170.68 179.30 8.63 1.74 
inAppAdvertising 0.17 0.182 0.164 -0.019 -10.68 0.148 0.145 -0.003 -0.27 
inAppPurchases 0.30 0.330 0.285 0.045 -20.92 0.339 0.334 0.006 -0.44 
Note: Apps that were already in Android 6.0 at the start of the panel are excluded from PSM DiD analysis. 
 
Table 3. 8. Analysis of Effects of Delaying Upgrading to Latest Version 
Panel A: Impact on essential permissions 
Dependent Variable PSM DID - essential_ dangerous_permissionsit PSM DID - essential_ dangerous_permissionsit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δrating_countit 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
ratingit 0.154*** (0.039) 0.259*** (0.048) 0.154*** (0.039) 0.263*** (0.048) 
post_upgradet 0.019*** (0.004) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.004) 0.018*** (0.005) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet -0.012 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) -0.019 (0.012) -0.045*** (0.012) 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet     0.010 (0.012) 0.051*** (0.012) 
dayssinceupdateit 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.011*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.003) 
filesizeit 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
developer_appcountit  -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Constant 0.431** (0.166) -0.239 (0.198) 0.429** (0.166) -0.260 (0.199) 
App Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Weighted by population NO YES NO YES 
# of Obs. 106065 106065  106065 106065 
R-Squared 0. 139 0.108  0.140 0.109 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; 
Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
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Panel B: Impact on nonessential permissions 
Dependent Variable PSM DID - nonessential_ dangerous_permissionsit PSM DID - nonessential_ dangerous_permissionsit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δrating_countit -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit -0.258** (0.100) -0.380*** (0.102) -0.263** (0.100) -0.389*** (0.102) 
post_upgradet -0.011 (0.008) 0.009 (0.009) -0.009 (0.008) 0.012 (0.009) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet -0.162*** (0.013) -0.176*** (0.014) -0.101*** (0.023) -0.110*** (0.024) 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet     -0.083*** (0.025) -0.092*** (0.026) 
dayssinceupdateit 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit -0.012 (0.007) -0.018* (0.008) -0.012 (0.007) -0.019* (0.008) 
filesizeit 0.001*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001) 
developer_appcountit  0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Constant 3.719*** (0.425) 4.114*** (0.435) 3.735*** (0.425) 4.150*** (0.435) 
App Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Weighted by population NO YES NO YES 
# of Obs. 106065 106065  106065 106065 
R-Squared 0.025 0.026  0.025 0.026 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; 






Panel C: Impact on Apps’ Ratings 
Dependent Variable PSM DID – log(ratingit) PSM DID – log(ratingit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit  0.000 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Δrating_countit 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
post_upgradet -0.090*** (0.011) -0.077*** (0.010) -0.087*** (0.011) -0.073*** (0.010) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet 0.100*** (0.016) 0.109*** (0.015) 0.168*** (0.033) 0.203*** (0.030) 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet     -0.092** (0.034) -0.129*** (0.031) 
dayssinceupdateit -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.014 (0.008) 0.025 (0.013) 0.013 (0.007) 0.025 (0.013) 
filesizeit 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
developer_appcountit  0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 
Constant 139.722*** (0.133) 137.904*** (0.206) 139.719*** (0.133) 137.907*** (0.206) 
App Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Weighted by population NO YES NO YES 
# of Obs. 106065 106065  106065 106065 
R-Squared 0.107 0.175  0.107 0.176 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; 





Panel D: Impact on Apps’ Popularity 
Dependent Variable PSM DID – popularityit PSM DID - popularityit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit  0.044*** (0.006) 0.033*** (0.007) 0.044*** (0.006) 0.033*** (0.007) 
Δrating_countit -0.000 (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) 
ratingit 14.038*** (1.015) 11.805*** (1.283) 13.992*** (1.014) 11.753*** (1.283) 
post_upgradet -0.036 (0.103) -0.142 (0.107) -0.010 (0.103) -0.124 (0.107) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet -0.478*** (0.130) -0.562*** (0.137) 0.126 (0.211) -0.155 (0.213) 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet     -0.822*** (0.223) -0.561* (0.230) 
dayssinceupdateit -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit -0.309* (0.155) -0.042 (0.179) -0.310* (0.154) -0.044 (0.179) 
filesizeit 0.006* (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 0.013*** (0.003) 
developer_appcountit  -0.042*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.002) -0.042*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.002) 
Constant -33.563*** (5.017) -32.280*** (5.884) -33.401*** (5.012) -32.061*** (5.881) 
App Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Weighted by population NO YES NO YES 
# of Obs. 106065 106065  106065 106065 
R-Squared 0.038 0.028  0.038 0.028 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; 











        




2.2(c): The Effect on Listing Rating 
 




   
Figure 2.3(a): The Effect on Listing Price: Female vs. Male Hosts 
    
Figure 2.3(b): The Effect on Listing Rating: White vs. African American Hosts 
 
Figure 2. 3. Heterogeneity in Outcomes of Forgoing Screening 
 
 
Figure 3. 1. Change in permission-seeking from download to run-time  
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  Fig 3.2(A): Distribution of words in sub-categories created from category “Productivity” 
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Fig 3.2(B): Distribution of words in sub-categories created from category “Lifestyle” 










Figure 3. 3. List of “similar apps” from Play Store 
 
 
Figure 3. 4. Essential and non-essential permissions over time and targetAPI 







Figure 3. 5. Parallel Trends Assumption 








Figure 4. 1. Multiple levels of interaction on multiple screens 




































































Table A1. Summary Statistics 
Variables # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
instant_bookableit 196155 0.16 0.36 0 1 
occupancyit 193184 0.54 0.38 0 1 
priceit 196155 167.87 122.26 10 1000 
ratingit 194535 89.55 14.08 20 100 
traditional_bookableit 46867 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Listing Demand Characteristics      
inst_book_groupi 196155 0.31 0.46 0 1 
post_switcht 196155 0.18 0.38 0 1 
switchback_groupi 196155 0.19 0.39 0 1 
post_switchbackt 196155 0.10 0.30 0 1 
average_occupancyit 196155 0.53 0.28 0 1 
competitor_instant_bookableit 196155 0.19 0.15 0 1 
competitor_superhostit 172900 0.10 0.11 0 1 
competitor_review_countit 196155 35.22 35.10 0 263.42 
Host Characteristics      
host_is_superhostit 172908 0.12 0.32 0 1 
host_tenureit 196155 751.08 520.18 3 3095 
host_is_professionalit 196155 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Control Variables      
review_countit 196152 32.18 36.28 0 408 
min_stayit 195869 2.56 3.25 1 180 
photosit 196152 16.05 11.36 1 197 
popularityit 196155 11.90 56.93 0 11583 
Note: (a) These statistics are based on the sample before propensity score matching. 
          (b) ratingit captures the guests’ overall satisfaction score of the listing, which is a more accurate 





Table A2. Correlation Matrix 
 Variables # Obs. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) instant_bookableit 196155 1.00                   
(2) occupancyit 193184 0.16 1.00                  
(3) priceit 196155 -0.09 -0.07 1.00                 
(4) ratingit 194535 -0.01 0.20 0.02 1.00                
(5) traditional_bookableit 46867 -0.73 -0.11 0.14 0.10 1.00               
(6) inst_book_groupi 196155 0.65 0.15 -0.09 0.01 . 1.00              
(7) post_switcht 196155 0.48 0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.60 0.69 1.00             
(8) switchback_groupi 196155 0.27 0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.39 0.72 0.73 1.00            
(9) post_switchbackt 196155 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.74 0.50 0.68 0.70 1.00           
(10) average_occupancyit 196155 0.18 0.73 -0.11 0.26 -0.12 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.06 1.00          
(11) competitor_instant_bookableit 196155 0.12 0.06 -0.17 0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.14 1.00         
(12) competitor_superhostit 172900 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.13 1.00        
(13) competitor_review_countit 196155 0.11 0.31 -0.02 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.49 0.23 0.27 1.00       
(14) host_is_superhostit 172908 -0.03 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.12 1.00      
(15) host_tenureit 196155 -0.08 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.15 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.49 0.04 1.00     
(16) host_is_professionalit 196155 0.16 0.02 -0.18 -0.07 -0.11 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 1.00    
(17) review_countit 196152 0.15 0.35 -0.06 0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.54 0.21 0.24 0.83 0.13 0.48 0.03 1.00   
(18) min_stayit 195869 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 1.00   
(19) photosit 196152 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.13 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.02 1.00  
(20) popularityit 196155 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 1.00 




Table A3. Sub-Sample Analysis of Switching to Instant Booking 
 Female Sub-Sample Male Sub-Sample 
Dependent variable (1) 
Logit - instant_bookableit 
(2) 
Logit - instant_bookableit 
occupancyit-1 2.856*** (0.317) 2.021*** (0.368) 
occupancyit-1 * occupancyit-1 -1.838*** (0.281) -1.211*** (0.328) 
Δoccupancyit-1 -0.250** (0.095) -0.267* (0.116) 
priceit-1 0.348 x10-3 (0.283 x10-3) -0.002*** (0.394 x10-3) 
Δpriceit-1 -0.002 (0.001) -0.004** (0.001) 
ratingit-1 -0.008*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) 
Δratingit-1 0.006 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 
review_countit-1 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 
host_is_superhostit -0.345*** (0.088) -0.268** (0.098) 
host_tenureit -0.001*** (0.883 x10-4) -0.001*** (0.118 x10-3) 
host_is_professionalit 0.651*** (0.060) 0.583*** (0.073) 
African Americani 0.708*** (0.068) 0.226* (0.091) 
Asiani -0.166 (0.091) -0.099 (0.102) 
Hispanici 0.313*** (0.078) -0.176 (0.104) 
Othersi 0.291** (0.096) 0.111 (0.100) 
Whitei (baseline)     
min_stayit -0.040** (0.014) 0.008 (0.009) 
photosit 0.027*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 
popularityit -0.187 x10-3 (0.311 x10-3) 0.197 x10-4 (0.955 x10-4) 
competitor_instant_bookableit 0.706*** (0.172) 0.654*** (0.186) 
competitor_superhostit -0.245 (0.240) -0.481 (0.303) 
competitor_review_countit -0.003* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Constant -3.490*** (0.188) -2.520*** (0.214) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.081 0.070 
Cancellation Policy Dummies YES YES 
Room Type Control YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES 





Table A4. Validation of Parallel Trend Assumption for DiD Estimation 
Dependent Variable (1) 
3SLS - Occupancyit 
(2) 
3SLS - Priceit 
(3) 
3SLS - Ratingit 
priceit 0.538 x10-3 *** (0.994 x10-4)   -0.020*** (0.002) 
ratingit-1 -0.001*** (0.165 x10-3) -0.116*** (0.013) 0.091*** (0.003) 
average occupancyit-1 -0.242*** (0.019) 23.784*** (1.517)   
occupancyit     -3.768*** (0.328) 
review_countit-1 -0.001** (0.346 x10-3) -0.103*** (0.025) -0.038*** (0.005) 
host_tenureit 0.232 x10-3 *** (0.240 x10-4) 0.025*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.450 x10-3) 
host_is_professionalit -0.006 (0.032) 1.389 (2.414) -0.243 (0.522) 
popularityit -0.171 x10-3 * (0.696 x10-4) -0.023*** (0.005) -0.349 x10-3 (0.001) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-11 -0.043 (0.063) -4.098 (5.077) -2.345* (1.098) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-10 0.076 (0.060) -3.836 (4.788) -1.790+ (1.035) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-9 -0.008 (0.057) -2.946 (4.573) -0.184 (0.988) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-8 -0.026 (0.056) -1.080 (4.464) -0.741 (0.965) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-7 0.023 (0.055) -2.339 (4.379) -0.805 (0.947) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-6 0.036 (0.054) -2.110 (4.322) -0.728 (0.934) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-5 0.041 (0.053) -1.234 (4.286) -1.145 (0.926) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-4 0.020 (0.053) -1.630 (4.256) -1.063 (0.920) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-3 0.015 (0.053) -0.420 (4.227) -0.853 (0.914) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-2 0.026 (0.053) 0.009 (4.212) -1.212 (0.910) 
inst_book_groupi*timet-1 0.027 (0.052) 1.199 (4.196) -0.930 (0.907) 
inst_book_groupi*timet   Omitted Baseline   
inst_book_groupi*timet+1 0.076 (0.052) 0.552 (4.191) -0.855 (0.906) 
inst_book_groupi*timet+2 0.080 (0.052) 1.162 (4.194) -0.810 (0.907) 
inst_book_groupi*timet+3 0.084 (0.052) 2.200 (4.194) -0.745 (0.907) 
inst_book_groupi*timet+4 0.090+ (0.052) 3.661 (4.197) -0.677 (0.908) 
inst_book_groupi*timet+5 0.072 (0.052) 2.484 (4.206) -0.728 (0.909) 
Constant -0.507*** (0.115) -22.298** (7.789) 60.607*** (2.090) 
Month Dummies YES YES YES 
Listing Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Cancellation Policy Dummies YES YES YES 
# of Obs. 21,784 21,784 21,784 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; + p<0.1 




Table A5. Switching Back to Regular Booking 
 Full Sample Female Sub-Sample Male Sub-Sample 
Dependent variable (1) 







occupancy_change_percentit-1 0.006 (0.008) 0.012 (0.013) 0.011 (0.008) 
price_change_percent it-1 0.046 (0.081) 0.181 (0.141) -0.088 (0.128) 
rating_change_percent it-1 -0.259*** (0.051) -0.141* (0.065) -0.534*** (0.108) 
review_countit-1 -0.017*** (0.002) -0.015*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.003) 
host_tenureit 0.001*** (0.547 x10-4) 0.001*** (0.782 x10-4) 0.001*** (0.827 x10-4) 
host_is_superhostit 0.404*** (0.075) 0.522*** (0.110) 0.228* (0.115) 
host_is_professionalit -0.136* (0.060) 0.099 (0.085) -0.189* (0.091) 
malei -0.033 (0.049)     
uncertaini -0.430*** (0.102)     
genderi=femalei (baseline)       
Whitei 0.152 (0.084)     
African Americani -0.225* (0.098) -0.375*** (0.094) -0.440*** (0.104) 
Asiani -0.065 (0.109) 0.257* (0.117) -0.681*** (0.129) 
Hispanici 0.110 (0.106) 0.213 (0.111) -0.384*** (0.116) 
race/ethnicityi=uncertaini   0.121 (0.130) -0.136 (0.124) 
race/ethnicityi=Whitei       
min_stayit 0.048*** (0.010) 0.038* (0.016) 0.046*** (0.014) 
photosit 0.128 x10-3 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
popularityit 0.482 x10-3 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 
competitor_instant_bookableit -1.023*** (0.168) -1.248*** (0.253) -1.013*** (0.245) 
competitor_superhostit 0.141 (0.229) -0.183 (0.345) 0.572 (0.330) 
competitor_review_countit 0.003 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 
Constant -1.715*** (0.138) -1.251*** (0.190) -1.981*** (0.207) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.055 0.047 0.068 
Cancellation Policy Dummies YES YES YES 
Room Type Control YES YES YES 
Month Dummies YES YES YES 
 # of Obs. 15953 6989 7034 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A6. App Categories 
Category Group Group Description Categories in the Group 
Content Consumption Apps that allow consumption 




Media and Video 




Learn and Explore Apps that allow users to learn 
and explore content on the 
mobile platform 
Art and Design 
Books and References 
Education 
Medical 
News and Magazines 
Travel and Local 
Weather 
Parenting 
Libraries and Demo 
 
Personal Apps that are personal to users Beauty 
Dating 





Utility – Mobile Access These are the utility apps that 
have a major offline/web 
presence and provides online 
access through the platform 
Business 
Auto and Vehicles 
Events 
Finance 




Utility – Mobile Specific These are utility apps that are 
present mainly on the mobile 
platform. Its existence depends 
on features of smart phone 
Maps and Navigation 






Games These are apps that are 
categorized as games by 




















Table A7. Summary Statistics 
Variables # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Key Variables      
dangerous_permissionsit 278,955 3.46 2.65 0 22 
essential_dangerous_permissionsit 278,955 0.74 0.77 0 10 
nonessential_dangerous_permissionsit 278,955 2.71 2.36 0 20 
normal_permissionsit 278,955 8.21 4.72 0 65 
upgradeit 278,955 0.48 0.50 0 1 
ratingit 278,955 4.04 0.37 1.86 4.96 
popularityit 278,955 9.07 15.40 0.00 548.86 
App Characteristics      
rating_countit 278,955 150079.30 1108175.00 39 75718104 
dayssinceupdateit 278,955 176.84 188.52 0 1087 
screenshotsit 278,955 12.50 5.55 2 33 
filesizeit 278,955 24.64 27.89 0.03 1800 
developer_appcountit 278,955 29.16 86.82 1 1914 
inAppAdvertisingit 278,955 0.19 0.39 0 1 
inAppPurchasesit 278,955 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Note: These statistics are based on the sample before propensity score matching. 






Table A8. Correlation Matrix 
 Variables # Obs. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) dangerous_permissionsit 278,955 1.00              
(2) essential_dangerous_permissionsit 278,955 0.50 1.00             
(3) nonessential_dangerous_permissionsit 278,955 0.96 0.24 1.00            
(4) normal_permissionsit 278,955 0.76 0.37 0.73 1.00           
(5) upgradeit 278,955 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 1.00          
(6) ratingit 278,955 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.11 1.00         
(7) popularityit 278,955 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.25 1.00        
(8) rating_countit 278,955 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.03 0.11 0.26 1.00       
(9) dayssinceupdateit 278,955 -0.19 -0.18 -0.15 -0.22 -0.23 -0.17 -0.19 -0.07 1.00      
(10) screenshotsit 278,955 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.01 1.00      
(11) filesizeit 278,955 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.30 1.00     
(12) developer_appcountit 278,955 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 1.00    
(13) inAppAdvertisingit 278,955 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 1.00   








Table A9. Moderating Effect of Revenue Models on the Effect of Dangerous Permissions in Delaying Upgrade to Android 6.0  
Dependent variable - upgradeit  (1) 
Hazard Ratios – Revenue Model 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit 0.996*** (0.001) 
inAppAdvertisingit 1.277*** (0.089) 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit X inAppAdvertisingit 0.994* (0.002) 
inAppPurchasesit 1.116 (0.069) 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit X inAppPurchasesit 0.999 (0.002) 
Δrating_countit 1.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit  1.049 (0.032) 
gamesi 0.860*** (0.032) 
personal_appsi 0.926 (0.040) 
utility_mobilespecifici 0.868*** (0.036) 
utility_mobileaccessi 1.059 (0.052) 
learn_explorei 1.090* (0.047) 
categoryi=content_consumptioni (baseline)   
below_1millioni 0.916*** (0.022) 
5million_10millioni  1.037 (0.039) 
10million_50millioni 1.190*** (0.051) 
above_50millioni 1.069 (0.103) 
downloadi=1million_5millioni (baseline)   
dayssinceupdateit 0.996*** (0.000) 
screenshotsit 1.012*** (0.002) 
filesizeit 1.002*** (0.000) 
Developer Controls YES 
Log Likelihood -71414.88 
AIC 142869.8 
BIC 143068.4 
 # of Obs. 152,190 
 Χ2 1486.20 
p 0.000 




Table A10: Parallel Trend Assumption - Upgrading to Latest Version  








dangerous_permissions_ratioit     -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.013) 
Δrating_countit -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
ratingit 0.093 (0.097) -0.714* (0.347)   -1.199 (2.437) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-7 0.001 (0.011) 0.039 (0.020) 0.021 (0.021) 0.001 (0.221) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-6 0.012 (0.009) -0.011 (0.014) 0.003 (0.013) -0.122 (0.136) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-5 0.001 (0.008) 0.003 (0.014) -0.020 (0.014) -0.070 (0.154) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-4 -0.012 (0.010) 0.034* (0.016) -0.013 (0.014) 0.119 (0.249) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-3 0.002 (0.010) -0.005 (0.020) 0.014 (0.017) 0.130 (0.178) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-2 0.007 (0.011) 0.002 (0.020) 0.013 (0.016) -0.112 (0.203) 
upgrade_groupi*timet-1 -0.012 (0.011) -0.019 (0.022) -0.013 (0.015) -0.023 (0.153) 
upgrade_groupi*timet0   (Omitted   Base Case)     
upgrade_groupi*timet+1 0.005 (0.008) -0.057** (0.020) -0.038* (0.016) -0.049 (0.124) 
upgrade_groupi*timet+2 0.004 (0.008) -0.040* (0.016) 0.050* (0.023) 0.327 (0.168) 
dayssinceupdateit 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
screenshotsit 0.022* (0.009) -0.017 (0.011) 0.001 (0.015) -0.110 (0.139) 
filesizeit 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) -0.007 (0.004) 
developer_appcountit -0.001 (0.000) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) -0.021 (0.016) 
Constant 0.422 (0.420) 5.327*** (1.417) 139.301*** (0.280) 8.634 (10.456) 
Month Dummies                        YES                  YES YES YES 
App Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
F-test (pre-treat coef. jointly 0) 0.71 1.26 0.95 0.31 
p 0.667 0.267 0.465 0.948 
# of Obs. 53672  53672  53672 53672 
R-Squared 0.082  0.031  0.089 0.80 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 








Table A11. Analysis of Effects of Delaying Upgrading to Latest Version – Sub Sample Analysis 
Dependent Variable (1) 
PSM DID - log(ratingit) 
(2) 
PSM DID – 
log(ratingit) 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit 0.003* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
Δrating_countit 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
post_upgradet -0.055* (0.027) -0.102*** (0.012) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet 0.317*** (0.071) 0.116** (0.039) 
late_upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet -0.226** (0.073) -0.055 (0.040) 
dayssinceupdateit 0.000* (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) 
screenshotsit -0.051** (0.018) 0.021** (0.008) 
filesizeit -0.002* (0.001) 0.001** (0.000) 
developer_appcountit  0.002** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 
Constant 140.851*** (0.285) 139.605*** (0.153) 
Month Dummies YES YES 
App Fixed Effect YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES 
Weighted by Population NO NO 
# of Obs.  23,562  82,503 
R-Squared  0.113  0.108 
      *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
      Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
Column 1 provides the sub-sample analysis where the treated apps did not reduce seeking non-essential dangerous 
permissions on average after upgrade, compared to before upgrade. 
Column 2 provides the sub-sample analysis where the treated apps reduced seeking non-essential dangerous 











Table A12. Analysis of Effects of Delaying Upgrading to Latest Version – Moderating effects of Download Groups  
Dependent Variable (1) 
DID – essential_dang_ 
permissionsit 
(2) 
DID – nonessential_dang_ 
permissionsit 
(3) 
PSM DID – 
log(ratingit) 
(4) 
PSM DID – 
popularityit 
dangerous_permissions_ratioit     0.003*** (0.001) 0.034*** (0.007) 
Δrating_countit 0.000 (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
ratingit 0.248*** (0.047) -0.384*** (0.102)   11.841*** (1.275) 
post_upgradet 0.043*** (0.010) 0.036 (0.019) -0.012 (0.020) 2.481*** (0.324) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet -0.099*** (0.013) -0.198*** (0.029) 0.003 (0.028) -1.398** (0.436) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet*mediumDGi 0.056** (0.020) 0.097* (0.041) 0.213*** (0.047) 0.593 (0.471) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet*lowDGi 0.055 (0.098) 0.288 (0.168) 0.324 (0.176) -1.260 (0.747) 
upgrade_groupi*post_upgradet*highDGi 
(baseline)         
late_groupi*post_upgradet*mediumDGi 0.085*** (0.015) -0.074* (0.031) -0.102** (0.039) 0.690** (0.214) 
late_groupi*post_upgradet*lowDGi 0.034 (0.096) -0.591*** (0.175) -0.141 (0.177) 0.579 (0.349) 
late_groupi*post_upgradet*highDGi 
(baseline)       
  
post_upgradet*mediumDGi -0.029** (0.011) -0.039 (0.020) -0.065** (0.021) -3.342*** (0.327) 
post_upgradet*lowDGi -0.115*** (0.024) 0.134*** (0.037) -0.338*** (0.048) -1.250* (0.615) 
post_upgradet*highDGi (baseline)         
dayssinceupdateit -0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) 
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Month Dummies YES YES YES YES 
App Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Download Bucket Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Weighted by Population YES YES YES YES 
# of Obs. 106065  106065  106065 106065 
R-Squared 0.111  0.027  0.176 0.032 
        *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
        Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
The popularity score of the most popular app is over a million times higher than the least popular app in my dataset. Hence it is imperative that apps with     
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